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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of the Royal Globe doctrine (increased insurance bad
faith liability) on automobile bodily injury insurance claims outcomes. The study
provides new evidence over a wide range of claim outcomes to paint a fuller pic-
ture of the effects of increased bad faith liability. The use of a “natural experiment”
created by the “random” nature of the Royal Globe decision and the utilization of
the powerful synthetic control method allows the study to make causal estimates
on observed claims settlement practices, an advantage over previous work. The re-
sults suggest that despite some previous findings, insurers are not too deterred that
they start paying more fraudulent claims and doing less investigations, and that
the true beneficiaries of bad faith liability may be those small claims that absent
the additional punitive damages would have no incentive to sue for claims un-
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1 Introduction
An insurance policy is not an ordinary contract. It is a complex in-
strument, unilaterally prepared and seldom understood by the insured.
The parties are not similarly situated. . . In short, the insurance company
may not ignore its insured and then seek refuge in the fine print of its
policy.
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pietrosh (Nev. 1969)1
Courts and legislatures have long recognized the “special relationship between
the insurer and the insured”2and have thus held insurers to a standard of “good
faith and fair dealing”3 with policyholders.4 Until the 1970s, however, policyhold-
ers were limited under English common law5 from recovering beyond the limits of
their insurance policies,6 even if the insurer intentionally breached the contract.7
Eventually jurisdictions began to expand the ability of policyholders to recover
for unfair treatment, but substantially differed in opinion on how to best protect
consumers.8
Depending on the situation, jurisdiction, and time, courts relied on different
strategies, such as, tort actions based solely on bad faith, contract actions with a
185 Nev. 310, 316 (1969).
2Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones, 94 P.3d 1055, 1068 (Cal. 2004).
3See Thompson v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 875 F.2d 1460 (10th Cir. 1989); Weese v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
879 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1989).
4See Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 539 F. Supp. 879, 883 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (“The superior
bargaining power of an insurance company over its insured has long been recognized in Iowa.”);
Noble v. National Arm. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981) (“The special nature of an
insurance contract has been recognized by courts and legislatures for many years.”); Grand Sheet
Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (“[T]he
unequal bargaining power of the parties, the special nature of the insurance business, and the
disastrous economic effects that a bad faith refusal to pay may cause the insured are paramount
considerations.”).
5See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
6See Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. Co., 149 Minn. 482 (1921).
7Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566 (1973), was the first case to allow plaintiffs
to apply tort liability to a first-party insurers bad faith.
8See Vance (1951); Stempel (2006); Tennyson and Warfel (2009) for a discussion of the develop-
ment of insurance bad faith liability.
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broad definition of damages,9 private causes of action based on statute,10 and the
general “competition among insurers,”11 to protect consumers from unfair insur-
ance industry practices. Even among the jurisdictions that allow tort actions based
solely on bad faith, there are various standards for determining bad faith, such
as, “negligence,”12 “intentional tort,”13 or a “quasi-criminal”14 standard (Tennyson
and Warfel, 2009). Despite the recent leveling off of bad faith liability when com-
pared to the “exciting days of the late 1970s and 1980s” (Abraham, 1994), the policy
implications for the degree of bad faith liability that insurers face are still relevant
(Jerry, 1994; Tennyson and Asmat, 2010).
There are many recent examples of jurisdictions changing or establishing in-
surance bad faith regimes. For example, in 2007 Washington expanded the defi-
nition of bad faith and increased the potential damages that policyholders could
recover15 and in 2008 Minnesota created a new private cause of action for first-
party insurance bad faith.16 Further, the intense discussion surrounding the con-
tentious passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the ACA” or
“Obamacare”)17 shows that the issue of consumer protection from potential unfair
insurance industry practices - an industry “legendary” for its “miserly proclivi-
ties” regarding settlement claims (Crocker and Tennyson, 2002, 470) - is of great
importance and debate.
9See Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
10See Conn. Gen. Stat. 38a-816, 42-110q (2009); Maher v. Contl Cas. Co., 76 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1999)
(applying West Virginia law to allow unlimited punitive damages against an insurer who engaged
in one or more statutorily prohibited practices).
11See Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849, 866 (2004) (the California Supreme
Court observed that, “generally speaking, the insurers ability to charge excessive premiums will be
disciplined by competition among insurers.”).
12See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958)
13See Anderson v. Contl Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978)
14See Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984).
15Wash. Rev. Code 48.30.010 (2007).
162008 Minn. Laws 604.18.
17P.L. 111-148 (2010).
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Despite the intense debate surrounding insurance bad faith liability, the net ef-
fect on social welfare from increased bad faith liability is unclear. An increase in
tort liability greatly increases the potential damages faced by an insurer for delay-
ing or underpaying a claim (Abraham, 1986, 1994; Sykes, 1996; Crocker and Ten-
nyson, 2002; Browne et al., 2004; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Tennyson and Asmat,
2010). Unlike contract law, tort law allows for the recovery for all harm or injuries
sustained (including legal expenses, economic loss, and mental distress) and has
the potential for punitive damages. Contract law, however, does not allow for
punitive damages and is restricted to the general or consequential damages result-
ing from, or reasonably foreseeable from, the original breach of contract (Garner,
1999; Tennyson and Warfel, 2008, 2009).18 Economic theory therefore predicts that
an increase in the expected judgments against insurers resulting from an increase
in exposure to bad faith liability will reduce the incentive of insurers to deny, de-
lay, or underpay claims (Abraham, 1986, 1994; Sykes, 1996; Crocker and Tennyson,
2002; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Tennyson and Asmat, 2010).19
The incentive created by increased bad faith liability to not deny, delay, or
underpay claims may or may not be efficiency enhancing.20 The incentive is ef-
ficiency enhancing if it discourages insurers from underpaying legitimate claims.
The same incentive to not underpay claims, may, however, encourage insurers to
pay “reasonably disputable claims” (emphasis added) (Abraham, 1986; Crocker and
Tennyson, 2002; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Tennyson and Asmat, 2010). Pay-
ing “reasonably disputable claims” is efficiency diminishing as it may increase the
18Posner (2011, 170-174) explains why punitive damages are “rarely awarded in contract cases.”
19See Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 318 (R.I. 1980) (“Recovery under a contract theory
aloneeffectively guards an insurers pocketbook against any threat of punitive damages. In this
atmosphere, insurers, backed by sufficient financial resources, are encouraged to delay payment of
claims to their insureds with an eye toward settling for a lesser amount than that due under the
policy.”).
For classic articles on deterrence, see Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970).
20Landes and Posner (1987, 1) describe the positive economic theory of tort law as if “judges who
created the law through decisions operating as precedents in the later cases were trying to promote
efficient resource allocation.”
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number of fraudulent claims that insurers receive and pay (Tennyson and War-
fel, 2009). To date, the empirical literature is not conclusive as to the net welfare
implications of increased bad faith liability.
This paper attempts to shed some light on the issue by taking advantage of
a unique “natural experiment” created by the California Supreme Court in Royal
Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court.21 The “unprecedented” Royal Globe doc-
trine allowed, for the first time, third-party bad faith suits (Casey, 1983). That is,
a third party to an insurance contract (neither the insurer nor the insured) could
bring a tort claim against an insurer for acting in bad faith to settle the third party’s
claim against the insured. This decision greatly expanded the potential bad faith li-
ability faced by insurers in only California (Gainer, 1989; Abraham, 1994; Hawken
et al., 2001).22 By analyzing individual automobile insurance claims that were set-
tled before and after the Royal Globe decision and using a synthetic control proce-
dure (see Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010), I calculate difference-
in-differences estimates for measures of claims settlements outcomes between Cal-
ifornia and a synthetic “California” made up of a weighted average of potential
control states. The strength of this method allows me to examine the causal effects
of increased bad faith liability.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section, Section 2,
examines the evolution of bad faith liability in the courts. Section 3 then discusses
the predictions of the economics literature on the effects of expanded bad faith
liability. I then turn, in Section 4, to a discussion of the previous empirical literature
and a description of the data and methods used in this study. Finally, Section 5
presents the empirical results and Section 6 offers the conclusions.
2123 Cal. 3d 880 (1979).
22The California Supreme Court overturned the Royal Globe decision in Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal v.
Firemans Fund Insurance Companies, 785 P.2d 250 (1988).
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2 Legal Analysis
2.1 The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The concept of an implied duty of good faith in contracts existed in the law for
at least the previous two thousand years (Jerry, 1994). Under Roman law, the ex
fide bona clause authorized judges to find an obligation for both parties to a con-
sensual contract to act in good faith (Sohm et al., 1907; Jerry, 1994). Further, in the
early part of the seventeenth century, the writ of assumpsit under English com-
mon law expanded to allow local courts to emphasize the “duties of good faith
and conscience” in contractual relations (Powell, 1956; Jerry, 1994). Eventually in
the eighteenth century under the guidance of Lord Mansfield, “contract law briefly
flirted” with the idea that a consideration was a feeling that one was morally obli-
gated (Jerry, 1994).23 As Lord Mansfield stated in Carter v. Boehm:24
The governing principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good
faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to
draw the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his
believing the contrary.
The notion of an implied duty of good faith entered American common law at
around the same time it entered English common law in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. Even though American courts relied on the doctrine of caveat emptor (“let the
buyer beware”) more than English courts, the duty of good faith always remained
in the United States (Jerry, 1994).25 Overtime, thousands of courts stated that there
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.26 For exam-
23In the eighteenth century, both David Hume and Adam Smith viewed an implicit duty to good
faith as existing in every contract (Atiyah, 1979).
243 Burr 1905 (1766).
25See Industrial & General Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1905) (“No one can be made by contract the
final judge of his own acts, for the law writes good faith into such agreements”).
26See Western oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957); L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United
States, 379 F.2d 559 (1966).
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ple, in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.27 the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that:
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall
do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means
that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
This statement is “hornbook law of contract” for both insurance and non-insurance
contracts (Stempel, 2006; American Law Institute, 1981).28
As Posner (2009) explains, the duty of good faith does not impose a “moral
duty” to complete a contract. There are many situations where the completion of
a contract is impossible at a reasonable cost29 or the breach of contract is efficient30
(see Posner, 2011, 149-158). Rather, the duty of good faith is “just a duty to avoid
exploiting the temporary monopoly position that a contracting party will some-
times obtain during the course of performance” (Posner, 2009, 1358). When par-
ties to a contract act sequentially (as opposed to simultaneously), one party may
put himself under the power of the other party. Consider, for example, a situation
27188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
28The Restatement (Second) Contracts 205 (American Law Institute, 1981) states that every “con-
tract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.”
29see e.g., Ridgely v. Conewago Iron Co., 53 Fed. 988 (E.D. Pa. 1893) (holding that a mining lease
requiring the lessee to mine four thousand tons of ore annually for a fixed sum per ton, or, failing to
mine the minimum quantity, to pay the fixed sum for the minimum quantity, did not obligate the
lessee to pay for the additional quantity after the ore on the premises was exhausted); Transatlantic
Financing Corporation v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.D.C. 1966) (“The doctrine of impossibil-
ity of performance has gradually been freed from the earlier fictional and unrealistic strictures of
such tests as the implied term and the parties contemplation. It is now recognized that a thing is
impossible in legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it
can only be done at an excessive and unreasonable cost.”).
30see e.g., Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Suppose that
by franchising Truck-O-Mat in the plaintiffs’ territory [which breaches the contract with plaintiff],
Mid-Continent increased its own profits by $150,000 and inflicted damages of $75,000 on the plain-
tiffs. That would be an efficient breach. But if Mid-Continent had known that it would have to
pay in addition to compensatory damages $100,000 in punitive damages, the breach would not
have been worthwhile to it and efficiency would have suffered because the difference between
Mid-Continent’s profits of $150,000 and the plaintiffs’ losses of $75,000 would (certainly after the
plaintiffs were compensated) represent a net social gain.”).
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where A pays his insurance premiums to insurer B, who agrees to compensate A
for any fire damage to his house in the future. Then, if A’s house burns down and
his only source of finances is the payment owed to him by B, A may agree to a
lower payment due to B’s monopoly position in the negotiations (see Posner, 2009,
1358-1359).31
2.2 Development of Bad Faith Liability
In almost all jurisdictions, for all non-insurance contracts, and for insurance con-
tracts before the 1950s, courts refused to recognize a separate cause of action for
bad faith breach of contract (Stempel, 2006).32 Pursuant to English common law,
as stated in Hadley v. Baxendale,33 insurers were only liable for damages up to the
policy limits. Despite the special relationship between the insurer and the insured,
and the insurers subsequent “duty to exercise good faith and diligence”34 when
dealing with the insured, courts refused to extend liability beyond the policy lim-
31For a similar non-insurance case, see Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico et al., 177 F. 99, 102
(9th Cir. 1902) (“A party who refuses to perform, and thereby coerces a promise from the other
party to the contract to pay him an increased compensation for doing that which he is legally
bound to do, takes an unjustifiable advantage of the necessities of the other party. . . . There can
be no consideration for the promise of the other party, and there is no warrant for inferring that
the parties have voluntarily rescinded or modified their contract. The promise cannot be legally
enforced, although the other party has completed his contract in reliance upon it.”)
32See Sherrin v. Northwestern Natl Life Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 373, 381 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying Alabama
law) (“[P]unitive damages are ordinarily not recoverable for breach of contract”); Jacobs v. Farmland
Mut. Ins. Co., 377 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Minn. 1985) (“[I]f plaintiffs cause of action is for breach of
contract, the damages recovered for the breach will not support an award of punitive damage
unless the breach also constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort”); Holmes (1897, 462)
(“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if
you do not keep it - and nothing else”).
33156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) (1854) (“It follows, therefore, that the loss . . . here cannot
reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly
and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract. For such loss
would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of
such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which,
perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract,
communicated to or known by the defendants. . . . [T]herefore, . . . [the Court] ought not to take the
loss . . . into consideration at all in estimating the damages.”).
34Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235 (1914).
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its even for an intentional breach of contract (Vance, 1951, 1004-1005).35 In order
to win greater damages plaintiffs had to file separate claims for an additional tort,
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud (Sykes, 1996).
Eventually in 1958, the California Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
bad faith liability for third party insurance in Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
ance Co.36 Third party insurance or liability insurance provides coverage for losses
that the insured party caused to another party (Garner, 1999, 806).37 The Court in
Comunale held that the “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires
the insurer to settle [a claim against the insured] in an appropriate case although
the express terms of the of the policy do not impose such a duty.”38 Because the
insurer “rejected a reasonable offer of settlement” and “wrongfully refused to de-
fend” the insured, the Court held the insurer liable for amounts in excess of the
policy limits.39 The rationale for increasing the potential liability faced by third
party insurers for bad faith claims settlements is best explained by the Second Cir-
cuit in Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co.:40
An insurer has an economic incentive not to settle, hoping that a jury
will bring in a verdict for less than the policy limits. But when such
hope goes awry. . . the insured is the loser, being personally responsible
for the excess. These conflicting interests between the insurer and the
insured cause them to rub against each other like unmoored rowboats
on a placid pond.
Nine years after Comunale, in 1967, the California Supreme Court allowed for
a separate cause of action under tort liability against an insurer that exercised bad
faith in settling a claim against one of its insured (Price, 1980). While relying on
35Mannheimer Bros v. Kansas Cas. Co., 149 Minn. 482 (1921).
3650 Cal. 2d 654 (1958).
37See the Symposium on “The Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance” in the Texas Law Re-
view (1994), 72(6), 1203-1702, for a full discussion of the development and implications of insurance
bad faith liability.
3850 Cal.2d 654, 659.
39Id. at 660.
40221 F.3d 394, 396 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying New York law).
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the ruling in Comunale that the “implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate case,”41 the Court in Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co.,42 imposed liability on the insurer “not for bad faith breach of the
contract but for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty
included within the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” According
to the Court, the breach of contract in the Crisci case “also constitutes a tort.”43
Today, 48 state courts have found an express cause of action for third-party
bad faith (Syverud 1990, 1120; Stempel 2006, §9, 100).44 A minority of those 48
states45 utilize a negligence based test to determine if an insurer breached its duty
to settle.46 The Court in Crisci, which adopted a negligence based test, explained
the criteria as, “liability may exist when the insurer unwarrantedly refuses an of-
fered settlement where the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is by
accepting the settlement.”47 The majority of courts, however, do not use the negli-
gence standard. Instead, these courts rely on a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Specifically, these states either require an affirmative bad faith48
4150 Cal. 2d 654, 659 (1958).
4266 Cal. 2d 425, 430 (1967).
43Id. at 434.
44The District of Columbia, Nevada, and West Virginia have never expressly accepted or rejected
a third-party bad faith tort cause of action (see Stempel 2006, §9, 94 and Syverud 1990, 1120).
45See Stempel (2006, §9, 100); Robertson v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 333 F. Supp. 739 (D. Or.
1970); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194 (1970); Stetler v. Fosha, 809 F. Supp.
1409 (D. Kan. 1992); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison Ass. Co., 600 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
46Windt (1988, 259) argues that although a negligence standard is the de jure minority rule, it is
the de facto majority rule because many cases have “in effect, held insurers liable even though they
acted in good faith.”
4766 Cal. 2d 425, 430 (1967).
48See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 366 SE 2d 93, 97 (Va. Sup. Ct. 1988) (“[A]n insured
. . . is required to show that the insurer acted in furtherance of its own interest, with intentional
disregard of the financial interest of the insured.”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 137 Mich. App. 381, 392 (1984) (quoting Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 652
(1929)) (“[T]he insurer does not act in bad faith if it refuses settlement in the honest belief that it
had a fair chance of victory, or keeping the verdict within the policy limit, or that the compromise
amount is excessive, or if it has legal defenses. On the other hand, arbitrary refusal to settle for a
reasonable amount, where it is apparent that suit would result in a judgment in excess of the policy
limit, indifference to the effect of refusal on the insured, failure to fairly consider a compromise and
facts presented and pass honest judgment thereon or refusal to settle upon grounds which depart
from the contract and the purpose of the grant of power, would tend to show bad faith.”); Diblasi
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or a failure to adequately consider the policyholder’s interests (Stempel, 2006, §9,
100-101).49
Most of the early bad faith claims were claims against third party insurers.50
It was not until 1973 that a state Supreme Court extended the tort of bad faith
to first party insurance.51 First-party or indemnity insurance is a policy that “ap-
plies to oneself or ones own property,” such as health, disability, and fire insurance
(Garner, 1999, 804). Again, leading the way, the California Supreme Court in Gru-
enberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.52 found that the insurers duty to settle in first-party
and third-party insurance claims were “merely two different aspects of the same
duty.” The Court reasoned that if an insurer:
. . . fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing,
without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by
the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.53
This tort action based solely on bad faith has the potential for the highest dam-
v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 99 (1989) (“[T]here is a cause of action only if the
decision not to settle within the policy limits was made in bad faith, meaning in gross disregard of
its insured’s interests”).
49See Hayes Bros., Inc. v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 634 F.2d 1119, 1123 (1980) (An insurer must
“give equal consideration to the interest of its insured, as well as itself, in evaluating a settlement
demand.”); Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F. 2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying Delaware law)
(quoting Eastham v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 273 Or. 600, 607 (1975)) (“Good faith requires the insurer,
in handling negotiations for settlement, to treat the conflicting interests of itself and the insured
with impartiality, giving equal consideration to both interests.”).
50See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 274 (1966) (“[W]e hold that in the present case
the policy provides for an obligation to defend and that such obligation is independent of the
indemnification coverage.”).
51Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566 (1973); The first court to uphold tort liability for bad
faith in first-party insurance was the Court of Appeals of California in Fletcher v. Western Natl Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401 (4th Dist. 1970) (“We hold that defendants threatened and actual
bad faith refusals to make payments under the policy, maliciously employed by defendants in con-
cert with false and threatening communications directed to plaintiff for the purpose of causing him
to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dispute is essentially tortuous in
nature and is conduct that may independent of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
constitute[] a tortuous interference with a protected property interest of its insured for which dam-
ages may be recovered to compensate for all detriment proximately resulting therefrom, including
economic loss as well as emotional distress resulting from the conduct or from the economic losses
caused by the conduct, and, in a proper case, punitive damages.”).
529 Cal. 3d 566, 573 (1973).
53Id. at 574.
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ages against the insurers as the injured party can recover for all damages (e.g., eco-
nomic losses, mental distress, legal fees, etc.), “regardless of whether these dam-
ages could have been anticipated” (Tennyson and Warfel, 2009, 205). Of the states
adopting the tort action based solely on bad faith, a minority use the “negligence”
(an insurer must consider the insured’s interest and its own when considering a
settlement offer)54 or a “quasi-criminal” standard (“evidence of bad faith must be
sufficient to show affirmative misconduct of a nature which is malicious, dishon-
est, or oppressive”).55 A majority of the states use an “intentional tort” standard,
which, as expressed for the first time by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Ander-
son v. Continental Insurance Co. (1978),56 defines the tort of bad faith as “a separate
intentional wrong, which results from a breach of duty imposed as a consequence
of the relationship established by contract”57 (see Tennyson and Warfel, 2009, 207-
213).
In addition to the tort based standard for first-party insurance bad faith liability,
other states have relied on contract actions with a broad definition of damages
or statutes. The contract action with the broad definition of damages was first
adopted in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.58 The Court reasoned that the policy
limits do not restrict the amount that the insurer can be held liable for a breach
of contract. Unlike the tort standard, however, an insurer can not face punitive
damages unless a separate tort is also alleged (e.g., fraud) (Tennyson and Warfel,
2009, 214). Finally, some states have adopted a private cause of action based on
statute for first-party insurance bad faith liability. Minnesota in 2008, for example,
passed legislation implementing the intentional tort standard, establishing certain
54According to Tennyson and Warfel (2009, 207, n24), at least eleven states use the negligence
standard. See, for example, State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152 (Alaska 1989).
55Aetna Casualty and Surety v. Broadway Arms, 664 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Ark. 1984). Arkansas is the
only state to use a “quasi-criminal” standard.
56271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
57Id. at 374.
58701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
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prerequisites for damages, banning punitive damages, and specifying costs and
attorney’s fees that people could recover under a newly created private cause of
action for first-party insurance bad faith (Tennyson and Warfel, 2009, 215-217).59
2.3 The Royal Globe Doctrine
In 1979, the California Supreme Court in the “landmark” (Casey 1983, 917; Aitken
and Abeltin 1987, 55) case Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court60 recognized,
“for the first time” (Aitken and Abeltin, 1987, 55), the right for third parties to an
insurance contact (not the insurer nor the insured) to bring tort actions against
an insurer for that insurer’s bad faith handling of a claims settlement. A simple
example is useful to show the novelty of the Royal Globe doctrine: A, a careful
driver, is legally driving his car through an intersection at the correct time and
speed. B, an unsafe driver, then illegally drives through a red light and hits A. The
evidence is clear that B is liable for A’s injuries and B has liability insurance up to
$10,000 through insurer C. A makes a settlement offer of $5,000 (significantly below
B’s policy limit), which is then rejected by B’s insurer, C, who at this point takes
over the defense. This is because the “standard liability policy provides that the
insurer ‘shall defend any suit’ alleging liability that would be covered by the policy
if the suit proved successful, even if the suit is ‘groundless, false, or fraudulent”’
(Abraham, 1986, 195).61 At trial, however, A wins a judgment against B for $50,000
and insurer C pays $10,000 to A (B’s policy limit). B is then liable for the remaining
$40,000 of the judgment, which A has not received yet.
The above hypothetical is a typical example of an insurers bad faith in settling
59Minn. Stat. Ann. 604.18.
6023 Cal. 3d 880 (1979).
61The liability insurer is required to defend the insured against any action brought, within the
coverage of the policy (Vance, 1951, 1004). See e.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,
50 Cal. 2d 654, 657 (1958) (“[The indemnity insurer] was obligated to defend any personal injury
suit covered by the policy, but it was given the right to make such settlement as it might deem
expedient.”).
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third party claims (see Tancredi, 1980). Before the Royal Globe doctrine, B would
have to sue insurer C for bad faith to recover the additional $40,000 to eventually
pay A. A, after the initial judgment, would have no recourse except to wait for B
to acquire the money necessary to pay the remaining verdict.62 After Royal Globe,
however, in California, A would be able to file a separate bad faith claim against in-
surer C, after the liability of the insured is first determined, to recover the damages
owed to him (and potential punitive damages).
The Royal Globe decision was completely unexpected. Only three years prior to
Royal Globe the California Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Murphy v. Allstate
Ins. Co.63 that the duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend to a third
party. According to the Court, “[a] third party should not be permitted to enforce
covenants made not for his benefit, but rather for others.”64 The Court in Murphy:
. . . firmly established that the duty of the insurer to settle a bona fide
claim runs only to the insured and not to the injured claimant. The
remedy of the injured party was clear: a suit against the insured. The
insured, in turn, had standing to sue the carrier directly for a breach of
the implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith if the insurer has
wrongfully refused to settle and a judgment exceeding the policy limits
was rendered (Meskin 1985, 378-379, quoting Price 1980, 1166-1167).
Based on the unanimous precedent set by the Court in Murphy, it was unexpected
that the same Court in Royal Globe would come to a conclusion three years later
that was seemingly “contrary to prior law.”65
The four to three majority in Royal Globe got around the Murphy decision by
finding that:
In the present case, plaintiff does not seek to rely upon the violation
of the insurers duty to its insured to settle plaintiffs claim. Rather, she
62See Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co, 17 Cal. 3d 937 (1976).
63Id.
64Id. at 944.
65Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d 880, 892 (1979) (RICHARDSON, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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relies upon the insurer’s duty owed to her as a claimant under [the Un-
fair Practices Act] subdivisions (h)(5) and (h)(4) of section 790.03, a duty
created by those statutory provisions and owed directly to plaintiff as
claimant.66
The subdivisions (h)(5) and (h)(4) of section 790.03 that the Court relied on in its
decision to “create or authorize[] the direct action against the insurer by the injured
party”67 were added to Californias Unfair Practices Act (1959)68 in 1972.69 The
decision in Murphy, however, was handed down in 1976. As Meskin (1985, 381-
382) points out, the California Supreme Court “had the same opportunity in 1976
as it did in 1979 to recognize this duty based upon the statute. In essence, the Royal
Globe court used an administrative statutory scheme to extend judicial law in a
direction that it had expressly refused to go only three years earlier.”
Further, according to Justice Richardson’s concurrence and dissent, “neither”
section 790.03 nor section 790.09 that the majority relied on in their decision, “cre-
ates or authorizes the direct action against the insurer by the injured party.”70
Section 790.03 describes “unfair claims settlement practices”71 and section 790.09
preserves any already existing “administrative,” “civil,” and/or “criminal” liabil-
ity.72 Eventually, ten years later in Moradi-Shalal v. Firemans Fund Ins. Companies,73
the California Supreme Court overruled its own decision in Royal Globe because
that decision “incorrectly evaluated the legislative intent underlying the passage
of section 790.03, subdivision (h).” No other state, except West Virginia in 198174
6623 Cal. 3d 880, 890 (1979).
67Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d 880, 893 (1979) (RICHARDSON, J., concurring
and dissenting).
68See Cal. Ins. Code 790 (LexisNexis 2009).
69Id. 790.03 (LexisNexis 2010).
70Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal.3d 880, 892 (1979) (RICHARDSON, J., concurring
and dissenting).
71Cal. Ins. Code 790.03 (LexisNexis 2010).
72Id. 790.09 (LexisNexis 2009).
7346 Cal. 3d 287, 292 (1988).
74Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E. 2d 252 (W.Va. 1981). See Offices of the Insurance
Commissioner (2005) for a study on the development and effects of the Jenkins decision.
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and Montana in 1983,75 followed the Royal Globe doctrine. The above evidence
demonstrates that the original conclusion in Royal Globe was surprising and likely
“startled the insurance industry” (Casey 1983, 917; Wagenseil 1979, 376).
75Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247 (1983).
19
3 Economic Analysis
3.1 Rationale for Bad Faith Liability
Economic theory predicts both positive and negative effects of increased bad faith
liability. While competitive market forces will usually constrain an insurer from
systematically underpaying claims, there are situations when this is not guaran-
teed. Insurers will rationally trade off the immediate cost savings of a reduction
in a claim’s payment and the discounted future costs of any negative reputational
effects (Tennyson and Asmat, 2010). For smaller claims, the potential gains to an
insurer from underpaying a claim may be outweighed by the reputational penal-
ties and the subsequent decline in demand for the insurer’s product. For larger
claims, however, the potential cost savings from underpaying the claims may out-
weigh the future loss of demand (Sykes, 1996).
Insurers may also underpay claims as a strategy to discourage claimants’ in-
centives to inflate claims (Bond and Crocker, 1997; Crocker and Morgan, 1998;
Crocker and Tennyson, 2002). By developing a settlement strategy that reduces
the marginal return of filing a larger claim, an insurer can reduce the incentive
of a claimant to invest resources in claims exaggeration/fraud.76 Such a strategy
necessarily underpays some claims. Crocker and Tennyson (2002) find empirical
support for this strategy in a large dataset of third-party insurance settlements for
automobile accidents. The authors show that for claims where the cost of filing
a fraudulent claim is low and thus the potential for fraud is high (e.g., wage loss
claims), insurers, on average, pay less at the margin than for claims where fraud is
more costly (e.g., claims for only medical expenses).
In the absence of legal sanctions for wrongfully underpaying claims, there ex-
76Crocker and Tennyson (2002) develop a formal model of an insurers’ optimal claims settlement
strategy, which involves the systematic underpaying of claims to deter loss exaggeration. In their
model, the extent of underpayment is limited by the potential litigation costs and bad faith liability
resulting from claims underpayment.
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ists an externality affecting insurers’ adoption of claims settlement strategies. Specif-
ically, the insurer only considers the benefits of claims underpayment and does not
consider the costs to other parties. If there are legal sanctions against the insurer,
however, which accurately reflect the costs incurred by the underpaid claimant,
then these sanctions will cause the insurer to “internalize[] both the benefits and
costs of aggressive claims settlement strategies” (Crocker and Tennyson, 2002, 504-
505). Therefore, bad faith liability can result in an efficient balance between the
costs of claims underpayment and the benefits from reduced claims fraud (Abra-
ham, 1986; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009).
Bad faith liability, a tort, which includes potential punitive damages, may only
be efficient, however, in specific instances. In general, insureds who are underpaid
(or denied payment) for legitimate claims, know that they were underpaid, can
sue for breach of contract, and have some certainty that the compensatory dam-
ages will be calculated with a fair degree of accuracy (see Posner, 2011, 322-323).
The necessity for punitive damages may therefore be rare, but “rare is not never”
(Posner, 2006, 746). With regard to insurance contracts, the most applicable sit-
uation where punitive damages may be efficient is for small claims.77 If insurers
systematically underpay some small claims, then the “aggregate damages may be
significant, [but] no single victim of the wrongful act has sufficient damages to
make suing worthwhile” (Posner, 2006, 746).78 By increasing the expected value
of the damages, bad faith liability may provide additional protection for smaller
claims by giving the claimants an incentive to sue if the insurer underpays the
claim.
77For a discussion of other situations where punitive damages may or may not be efficient, see
Posner (2006, 745-747) and Posner (2011, 320-323).
78If punitive damages are not allowed, the parties to small contracts may be compensated in the
price for not having adequate legal remedies incase of a breach (Posner, 2006, 746).
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3.2 Potential Unintended Consequences of Bad Faith Liability
Despite the potential efficiency enhancing effects of bad faith liability, the threat of
increased liability can substantially distort claims settlement negotiations (Sykes,
1996).79 The implications of insurance bad faith liability become less clear when
considering that not all claims that insurers underpay are legitimate. In other
words, insurers do and should question “reasonably disputable claims” (Abra-
ham, 1986). It is therefore not the case, as some argue, that “there are no efficient
breaches in the insurance context; breaches of insurance contracts can only be op-
portunistic” (Capozzola, 2000, 196). There are sometimes legitimate factual and
legal disputes (Posner 2011, 323; also see Sykes 1996).
Extending bad faith liability significantly increases the potential costs of litiga-
tion to insurers, which increases the pressure on insurers to pay reasonably dis-
putable claims. If the expected costs of litigation to insurers significantly increases
relative to the benefits of investigations and audits, then insurers will have less of
an incentive to invest in these fraud reduction strategies. For example, conducting
an investigation on a suspicious claim will delay the time until the claim gets paid
and may result in a bad faith suit, which, win or lose, the insurer has to pay to
defend against. Specifically, this threat of increased bad faith liability may lead to
less claim investigations then there should efficiently be (Abraham, 1986; Tennyson
and Warfel, 2009).
Further, the distortionary effects of increased bad faith liability may be more
severe in the long run than in the short run. The cost savings that insurers receive
from fraud detection strategies may mainly come from deterrence effects, rather
than the identification of specific instances of fraud. Implementing fraud detec-
tion strategies increases the costs of claimants committing fraud and increases the
79See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a comprehensive overview of the litigation settlement
literature.
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probability that those claimants are identified and punished.80 By reducing the in-
centives of insurers to use fraud detection strategies, however, increased bad faith
increases the expected return on fraudulent claims and thus incentivizes claimants
to engage in fraud (Picard, 2000; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009).
80The potential legal penalties for entering fraudulent claims can be severe. Derrig and Zicko
(2002) analyzed the 6,684 (combined to 3,349) automobile and workers’ compensation claims that
were referred to and accepted by the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts between 1991 and
2000. The authors found that 552 cases were referred to prosecution with 84 percent resulting in
guilty or equivalent verdicts. Of the cases resulting in a guilty or equivalent verdict, 44 percent
received jail sentences, 62 percent received probation and 58 percent received restitution.
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4 Research Design
4.1 Relationship to Existing Literature
There are only a few studies that have tried to empirically evaluate the effects of
increased insurance bad faith liability on claims settlements (Hawken et al., 2001;
Browne et al., 2004; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Hyman et al., 2011; Tennyson and
Asmat, 2010). Most of these studies are cross-sectional in nature and do not ad-
dress a “causal” link between increased insurance bad faith liability and particular
claims settlement characteristics and/or practices (Browne et al., 2004; Tennyson
and Warfel, 2009; Hyman et al., 2011). Further, many of the studies focus on only
one or a few claims settlement characteristics, which precludes an analysis on the
effects of increased bad faith liability on net social welfare (Hawken et al., 2001;
Browne et al., 2004; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Hyman et al., 2011; Tennyson and
Asmat, 2010).
First, based on an anecdotal analysis of case law, Sykes (1996) concludes that
there may be substantial problems with courts applying extracontractual bad faith
liability. Specifically, Sykes (1996) finds examples of insurers being found liable
for bad faith for refusing to pay claims that were potentially fraudulent,81 for ar-
guably unnecessary treatments,82 and possibly outside the scope of the insurance
contract.83 For example, in Frommoethelydo v. Fire Insurance Exchange,84 the in-
surer refused to pay a claim for stolen property because the insurer believed it
81See T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985) (the insurer was
found liable for bad faith for refusing to pay a claim where there was evidence that the insured
committed arson on his own property).
82See Aetna life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984) (the insurer was found liable
for bad faith for refusing to pay a claim for some of the insureds treatments that the insurers experts
believed were not “necessary” or “reasonable.”).
83See Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 647 P. 2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982) (the insurer was
found liable for bad faith for refusing to pay a claim where it was not clear in the contract if the
insured was covered for treatments after he stopped paying for insurance but for injuries sustained
when he was still insured).
8442 Cal. 3d 208 (1986).
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was fraudulent. At trial, the insurer noted that the claim was the insured’s second
claim in less than a year, experts believed that the receipt presented for $3,000 of
audio/video equipment was altered, and a store clerk testified that the plaintiff
asked him to backdate the receipt for the audio/video equipment. Despite these
facts, a jury still found the insurer liable for less than $9,000 for the stolen property
claim, $250,000 for emotional distress, and $1.25 million for punitive damages (the
California Supreme Court reversed all damages except for the property claim and
ordered a new trial on the damages question). Based on his analysis, Sykes (1996,
405) concluded that the “remedy” of bad faith liability “may be worse than the
problem, as the courts seem to find bad faith on the part of insurers who have gen-
uine and reasonable disputes with their policyholders over the terms of the policy
or over factual issues essential to the insureds right to recover.”
Moving on to a more empirical analysis, Hawken et al. (2001), like this paper,
study the effects of the Royal Globe doctrine on automobile injury claims. For the
first part of their analysis the authors rely on aggregate statewide data to show
that the number of third-party automobile injury claims increased and decreased,
relative to other states, with the adoption and future rejection of the Royal Globe
doctrine. Unlike this paper, however, for the second part of their analysis the au-
thors do not focus on comparing claims characteristics in California to other states
before and after the adoption of Royal Globe. Instead, the authors compare claims
characteristics in California to other states before and after the Royal Globe doctrine
was overturned in Moradi-Shalal. The authors found that compensation payments
in California were 26 percent higher than compensation payments in other states
when Royal Globe was in effect but that trend reversed when Royal Globe was over-
turned.
While the authors did rely on a difference-in-differences design to attempt to
draw a causal connection between the overruling of Royal Globe and claims settle-
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ment characteristics, there was a significant confounding event. In the same year
that Royal Globe was overturned, California adopted Proposition 103, which made
major changes to insurance rate regulation in the state (see e.g., Shelor and Cross
1990; Sugarman 1990; Szewczyk and Varma 1990; Fields et al. 1990). The Proposi-
tion required, among other mandates, that every insurer reduce its rates by at least
20 percent,85 limited the amount of criteria insurers could use to create automobile
insurance rates,86 and required preapproval of rates.87 The potential confounding
effects from Proposition 103 make it difficult to disentangle the effects from the
overturning of the Royal Globe doctrine that Hawken et al. (2001) found, from the
effects of the changes in regulation (Tennyson and Asmat, 2010).
In addition, further empirical analyses of insurance claims settlements shows
that increased first-party insurance bad faith liability is associated with higher
claims settlements, an increased prevalence of fraud “red flags,” and less insur-
ance company investigations. Browne et al. (2004) utilize a large dataset of first-
party automobile insurance claims settled in 38 states in 1992. After controlling
for multiple factors that are expected to be associated with the size of settlement
payments, the authors find that claim settlements are higher in states that allow for
private actions for insurer bad faith (for both the economic and non-economic por-
tions of the settlements). Further, Tennyson and Warfel (2009) examine first-party
automobile insurance claims settled in 1997 to show that bad faith liability is asso-
ciated with more fraud “red flags” (e.g., lack of a police report, only or primarily a
sprain injury, etc.)88 being settled and less investigations (e.g., medical audits and
independent medical exams) by insurance companies. While Browne et al. (2004)
and Tennyson and Warfel (2009) do shed valuable light onto questions regarding
85Cal. Ins. Code 186.01 (a) (LexisNexis 2010).
86Id. 186.02 (a) (LexisNexis 2010).
87Id. 186.01 (c) (LexisNexis 2010).
88Crocker and Tennyson (2002, 469) show that insurer underpayment of claims is associated with
claims for which “loss exaggeration is easier.”
26
bad faith liability, both studies show associations and do not address a causal link
between claim characteristics and bad faith liability.89
Finally, Tennyson and Asmat (2010)90 attempt to draw the first causal connec-
tion between first-party insurance bad faith liability and claims characteristics. The
authors rely on cross-state and over-time variation in state bad faith regimes while
utilizing a large dataset of first-party automobile insurance claims settled in 42
states in 1977, 1987, and 1997. Consistent with their hypotheses, the authors show
that adopting insurer bad faith liability increases claim settlements and decreases
the probability of claims being underpaid. Further, they find that the impact of
tort liability on settlement amounts is greater for smaller claims. Based on these
findings, however, “normative inferences regarding the consequences of bad faith
laws on claim settlements are not possible” (Tennyson and Asmat, 2010, 26). As
the authors note, higher claims settlements may be evidence of insurers paying le-
gitimate claims that they would have otherwise underpaid or evidence of insurers
overpaying claims (potentially fraudulent claims).
Due to the lack of evidence on the causal effect of increased bad faith liability
on net social welfare, Abraham (1994); Jerry (1994); Tennyson and Warfel (2009);
Tennyson and Asmat (2010) noted the need for additional studies. This study uses
the increase in third-party insurance bad faith liability faced by insurers in only
California, created by the Royal Globe doctrine, to provide causal estimates of the
effects of increased bad faith liability on a wide range of closed claim outcomes.
89Hyman et al. (2011) also empirically evaluate an association between bad faith liability and
claims characteristics. Using data from Texas for 1988-2005 on closed, commercially insured per-
sonal injury claims, the authors show that most claims are settled at or close to the policy limit.
They also demonstrate that claims settled at policy limits, settle quicker.
90See Asmat (2009) for a similar analysis.
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4.2 Hypotheses
This study aims to add to the current debate by examining closed claim outcomes
related to the welfare implications of insurance bad faith liability. As discussed
above, the previous literature is mostly associational and only focuses on one or a
few aspects of claims characteristics or settlement practices. This precludes mak-
ing a welfare argument regarding bad faith liability. Increased claims settlements,
for example, may be a result of insurers not underpaying legitimate claims (effi-
ciency enhancing) or overpaying illegitimate claims (efficiency diminishing). This
study, therefore analyzes various aspects of claims characteristics and settlement
practices to paint a fuller picture of the effects of bad faith liability on net social
welfare. Specifically, I look at the effects of increased third-party insurance liabil-
ity in California before and after Royal Globe, relative to a control group of states,
on the average compensation paid for third-party automobile bodily injury (BI)
claims, the average time period until a settlement is made for BI claims, the fre-
quency of fraud red flags in settled BI claims, and the rate of insurance company
investigations for settled BI claims.
The characteristics of the data influence the specific hypotheses that I will test.91
First, the data only contains automobile insurance claims that were settled for some
amount. Therefore, it is not practical to test for the frequency or severity of BI
claims. Second, the data does not have information on the bargaining demands of
the injured parties for non-economic damages, such as mental distress. The data
is, however, well suited to test the hypotheses that increased third-party insurance
bad faith liability from Royal Globe causes an increase in special damages paid, an
increase in total damages paid, a decrease in the level of undercompensation, a
decrease in the time between the claim and the first payment, an increase in the
91Similar data is used by Crocker and Tennyson (2002); Browne and Schmit (2008); Tennyson and
Warfel (2009) and Tennyson and Asmat (2010).
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number of fraud red flags, and a decrease in the number of insurance company
physical investigations for closed claims in California, relative to the same out-
comes for closed claims in a control group of states.
In total, I test the following specific hypotheses:
H1: For similar settled BI claims, the average specials paid in California will
increase relative to the control group of states.
H2: For similar settled BI claims, the average total compensation paid in Cali-
fornia will increase relative to the control group of states.
H3: For similar settled BI claims, the percent of claims that are under-compensated
will decrease in California relative to the control group of states.
H4: For similar settled BI claims, the average length of time between the claim
being filed and the first payment will decrease in California relative to the control
group of states.
H5: For similar settled BI claims, the average number of fraud red flags will
increase in California relative to the control group of states.
H6: For similar settled BI claims, the average number of physical examinations
will decrease in California relative to the control group of states.
The relative magnitudes of hypotheses H1 to H6 may shed light on the impact
on net social welfare of increased bad faith liability. If, for example, the average
compensation paid increases, the average time before the first payment decreases,
and the number of fraud red flags does not change (or increase to a similar magni-
tude) for similar closed claims in California relative to the control group of states,
then the increase in bad faith liability may be efficiency enhancing.
4.3 Data and Variables
To test the above hypotheses I rely on a countrywide sample of administrative
claims data for closed bodily injury liability claims collected by the Insurance Re-
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search Council (IRC).92 Bodily injury liability insurance covers “insured’s legal li-
ability if he causes bodily injury to someone else through the ownership, main-
tenance or use of the vehicle, up to policy limit specified” (All-Industry Research
Advisory Committee, 1979, 8). The participating insurers completed an extensive
questionnaire for every claim closed during a two week period in 1977 and in
1987. The 1977 and 1987 data were obtained from 29 and 34 leading auto insur-
ers and include 21,885 and 21,584 bodily injury claims, respectively. Collectively,
the participating insurers represented about 60 percent of the countrywide vol-
ume of private passenger automobile insurance written in the U.S. at the time they
were sampled.93 Most claims are from accidents occurring in 1976-1977 and 1986-
1987, but accidents extend from 1970-1977 and 1980-1987. All claimed losses are
converted to 1987 dollars. From the data, I focus on the following closed claim
outcomes:
Specials paid: The compensation (in $10,000) for “[s]pecific expenses incurred by
claimant as a result of the accident” (All-Industry Research Advisory Committee,
1979, 8).94 To adjust for inflation, the amounts for 1977 closed claims are converted
to 1987 dollars.95
92The IRC (previously the All-Industry Research Advisory Council (“AIRAC”)) is an indepen-
dent, not-for-profit organization supported by leading property-casualty insurance organizations.
Its mission is to provide “timely and reliable empirical research to all parties involved in public
policy issues affecting risk and insurance. It does not advocate public policy or directly influence
specific legislative initiatives or engage in lobbying communications.” (http://www.ircweb.org/)
93To increase response rates, each insurer was allowed to select the two week period (10 consecu-
tive work days in 1977) that they were going to respond for. In 1977, insurers were allowed to select
a time period between October 2nd and November 20th. In 1987, most of the sampling took place
in May, June and July. See All-Industry Research Advisory Committee (1979) and All-Industry
Research Advisory Council (1989) for a more detailed description of the data.
94For claims closed in 1977, specials paid is calculated as the amount reimbursed for emergency
treatment + outpatient diagnostic exams + outpatient drugs + x-rays + physical therapy + inpatient
hospital charges + physician + all other medical + wage loss + essential services + rehabilitation +
funeral expenses (see All-Industry Research Advisory Committee, 1979, 159). For claims closed in
1987, specials paid is calculated as the amount reimbursed for total medical expenses + wage loss
+ expenses for replacement services + rehabilitation expenses + other expenses (see All-Industry
Research Advisory Council, 1989, 164).
95All conversions for inflation are done using the CPI Inflation Calculator provided by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, available at http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (accessed
February 20, 2011). One dollar in 1977 had the same purchasing power as $1.8746 in 1987.
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Total paid: The total of all amounts paid (in $10,000) to the claimant in set-
tlement of the claim. This amount is equal to the specials paid plus the general
damages paid. General damages paid are the compensation for “infringement on
civil rights in excess of economic loss. Includes such things as past or future in-
convenience, continuing disability and/or disfigurement” (All-Industry Research
Advisory Committee, 1979, 8). To adjust for inflation, the amounts for 1977 closed
claims are converted to 1987 dollars.
Undercompensation: A binary variable, equal to one if there were any economic
losses uncompensated for, or equal to zero if the economic losses were fully com-
pensated or if the only reason for the economic losses being under-compensated is
that the claimed loss exceeded the policy limits.
Days until first payment: The number of days from the day of the accident to the
day the first payment was made.
Fraud red flags: The number of fraud red flags appearing in a closed claim. Fol-
lowing Tennyson and Warfel (2009, 227), the fraud red flags used are that the injury
report was received after the accident report and that only a sprain/strain injury.96
The lack of a noticeable injury at the time of the accident makes it more likely that a
claimed injury is exaggerated or fictitious. It is possible that a victim did not notice
his/her injury on the day of the accident but it is increasingly unlikely. Further,
soft tissue injuries are difficult to medically verify and are “prone to falsification
and exaggeration” (Tennyson and Warfel 2009, 227; Dionne and St-Michel 1991,
238-239). For this reason, only sprain/strain injuries reported are used as fraud
red flags. This variable is standardized between zero and one.
Physical examinations: A binary variable, equal to one if the insurer required a
physical examination, and equal to zero if the insurer did not require a physical
examination.
96See Weisberg and Derrig (1991, 1996) for a discussion of indicators of potential fraud.
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4.4 Empirical Methods
To formally test each of the above hypotheses I utilize a difference-in-differences
(“DD”) procedure. In DD studies, researchers examine the progression of an out-
come (e.g., unemployment rates, literacy rates, etc.) for a unit affected by a partic-
ular event (usually a law) and compare it to the progression of the same outcome
for a “control” group of units unaffected by the event. DD studies are widely used
by social scientists (Bertrand et al., 2004; Puhani, 2008; Meyer, 1995; Athey and
Imbens, 2006).
Snow (1855), for example, was probably the first researcher to use such a method
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 227-228). Snow showed that cholera was transmitted
in London through contaminated drinking water by comparing changes in death
rates between two water companies. In 1849, both companies obtained their water
from the dirty Thames River in central London and their customers had similar
death rates. In 1852, however, one of the companies moved their water intake to a
relatively clean position up stream and its customers realized a drop in death rates
relative to the alternate company. Card and Krueger (1994), in a well known study,
analyze the employment between a sample of fast food restaurants in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania before and after the New Jersey minimum wage law went into
effect. Further, Pischke (2007) estimates the effects of changes in school term length
on student performance by utilizing changes in policy in some German counties,
relative to Bavaria (the control), which experienced no policy change.
In order for a DD study to produce an unbiased estimate of the effect of the
intervention, it is necessary that the intervention is “as good as random” (Bertrand
et al., 2004, 250). As Besley and Case (2000) note, however, the adoption of policies
can be endogenous. For example, “economic conditions that brought about [a]
policy change may have independent effects on the outcome variable of interest”
(Besley and Case, 2000, F688). Fortunately, the Royal Globe decision does not appear
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to suffer from potential endogeneity. As discussed above, the decision was not in
response to a change in law or societal factors but the result of the Court’s different
interpretation of the same law. The decision was “unprecedented” and “startled
the insurance industry” (Casey 1983, 917; Wagenseil 1979, 376; Aitken and Abeltin
1987, 55).
In addition to the exogenous intervention requirement, it is also necessary for
the control group of units to be an adequate counterfactual to the treated unit (i.e.,
represent what the outcomes of interest in California would have been had it not
been for the Royal Globe decision). “The question of whether this comparison is
a good one deserves careful consideration” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 241). In
DD studies there is usually some “degree of ambiguity about how comparison
units are chosen” (Abadie et al., 2010, 493). As Abadie et al. (2010, 493-494) argue,
traditional regression based methods are susceptible to two main shortcomings.
First, the lack of a systematic way of choosing controls removes transparency by
allowing researchers to select controls while seeing how those decisions affect the
outcome. Second, it is often challenging to pick a control to adequately approx-
imate the treated unit. Difficulties arise “if pre-treatment characteristics that are
thought to be associated with the dynamics of the outcome variable are unbal-
anced between the treated and the untreated group” (Abadie, 2005, 2).
Even while controlling for observed individual claim characteristics and state
fixed effects, it may be too strong of an assumption to assume that the most ap-
propriate control for California is all of the remaining states (see Fitzpatrick, 2008,
21). It is more likely that California (or any other state) will trend more closely
with states that have similar characteristics. In other words, it is more likely that
unobserved characteristics in California would have trended similarly, but for the
treatment (Royal Globe), to unobserved characteristics in states that resemble Cal-
ifornia than in very different states. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Fitzpatrick
33
(2008), and Abadie et al. (2010) all show that similar states (created using the syn-
thetic control procedure defined below) trend better with each other than when
compared to a national average.
I therefore follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) by us-
ing a “data-driven procedure” to select an adequate counterfactual by designing a
“synthetic control” of multiple units (the Abadie-Diamond-Hainmueller method).97
The general idea is that a combination of units usually provides a better compari-
son to the one treated unit than just a single unit would (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Abadie et al., 2010). Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), for example, develop
a synthetic unit made up of two Spanish regions to approximate the economic
growth that the Basque country would have experienced, but for terrorist activity.
While Abadie et al. (2010) use five states to construct a synthetic California to es-
timate the per-capita cigarette sales that California would have experienced had
Proposition 99 not been implemented. In both studies the authors demonstrate
that the “synthetic control” they create trends with the treated unit better than a
national average or an average of all of the potential control units (Abadie and
Gardeazabal 2003, 113; Abadie et al. 2010, 499-500).
Many other researchers have implemented the Abadia-Diamond-Hainmueller
method for a wide range of applications. Fitzpatrick (2008) examines the effects
of universal pre-kindergarten, Groen and Polivka (2008) study the effect of Hurri-
cane Katrina on the labor market outcomes for evacuees, Nannicini and Billmeier
(2011) study the effects of trade openness on economic growth, Forlani (2009) an-
alyzes the efficiency changes in Irish firms’ productivity due to variations in input
composition, Trandafir (2009) examines the effects on different-sex marriages after
the passage of same sex marriage laws in the Netherlands, and Keele (2009) studies
the effects of ballot initiatives on state voter turnout and fiscal policy. The strengths
97See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for an additional description of the Abadie-Diamond-
Hainmueller method and a discussion of the new developments in the causal evaluation of policies.
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and versatility of the synthetic control method make it well suited to apply to this
study’s setup and data.
As this study aggregates data at the state level, in order to avoid using small
sample sizes, states that have less than 35 total observations are dropped.98 In ad-
dition, to avoid comparing states that would likely not trend in the same way as
California, but for Royal Globe (e.g., states that experienced a change in a relevant
law, states that are significantly different from California, etc.), observations from
states that use no fault liability,99 changed their third-party insurance bad faith li-
ability laws,100 adopted a private cause of action under an unfair claim settlement
practices statute,101 and/or implemented a Royal Globe type decision102 during the
time period of interest (1975-1987) are removed. I restrict the sample to obser-
98I only consider claims with a positive claimed economic loss.
99States that used no fault liability between 1975-1987: Colorado; Connecticut; District of
Columbia; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Kansas; Kentucky; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; New
Jersey; New York; North Dakota; Pennsylvania; and Utah (All-Industry Research Advisory Com-
mittee 1979, 9; All-Industry Research Advisory Council 1989, 136-148.
100States that changed their third-party insurance bad faith laws between 1975-1987: Alaska (Con-
tinental Ins. Co. v. Bayless Roberts, Inc., 608 P2d 281 (Alaska 1980)); Colorado (Farmers Group, Inc. v.
Trimble, 691 P2d 1138 (Colo 1984)); Florida (Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 382 So 2d 783 (Fla
1980)); Georgia (McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga 869 (1984)); Illinois (Edwins v. General Cas. Co.,
78 Ill App 3d 965 (1979)); Iowa (Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 NW2d 30 (Iowa 1982));
Michigan (Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Mich App 381 (1984)); Minnesota
(Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 NW2d 384 (Minn 1983)); Montana (Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co.,
682 P2d 725 (Mont 1984)); Nebraska (Hadenfeld v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 195 Neb 578
(1976)); New Jersey (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 72 NJ 63 (1976)); New
Mexico (Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 102 NM 28 (1984)); Oregon (Maine
Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or 514 (1985)); Rhode Island (Voccio v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 703 F2d 1 (Ca1 1983)); and Vermont (Myers v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 508 A2d 689 (Vt 1986)). See
Ashley (1987, 89-134).
101States whose courts recognized a private cause of action arising from an unfair claims settle-
ment practices statute between 1975-1987: Arizona (Sparks v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz
529 (1982)); Connecticut (Griswold v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 186 Conn 507 (1982)); Florida (Fla Stat
Ann 624.155); Massachusetts (Mass Ann Laws ch 176D, 3(9); Whitney v. Continental Ins. Co., 595 F
Supp 939 (D Mass 1984)); Montana (Mont Code Ann 33-18-201; Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P2d 1065 (Mont
1983)); North Dakota (ND Cent Code 26.‘-04-03(9); Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 626 F Supp 583 (D ND 1985)); Rhode Island (RI Gen Laws 9-1-33); Virginia (Va Code 38.‘-15.9;
Morgan v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 559 F Supp 477 (WD Va 1983)); and West Virginia (W Va
Code 33-11-4(9); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 SE2d 252 (W Va 1981). See Ashley (1987,
89-134).
102States that implemented a Royal Globe type decision between 1975-1987: Montana (Klaudt v.
Flink, 202 Mont. 247 (1983)); and West Virginia (Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E. 2d
252 (W.Va. 1981)). See Stempel (2006, 9.05-9.06).
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Table 1: Closed Claims by Year Closed and Accident Year
Year Closed
Accident Year 1977 1987 Total
1975 430 0 430
1976 1,135 0 1,135
1977 3,132 0 3,132
1985 0 1,171 1,171
1987 0 5,585 5,585
1986 0 4,530 4,530
Total 4,697 11,286 15,983
vations from 1975-1977 and 1985-1987 to allow for states that changed their bad
faith liability laws between 1970-1974 to be included (there are only a few observa-
tions between 1970-1974 and 1980-1984). Appendix Table A.1 shows the bad faith
liability and general terms of liability for automobile accidents in effect in states
between 1970 and 1987. Table 1 shows the number of remaining closed claims by
the accident year and the year the claim was closed.
To produce a synthetic California that approximates how insurers in California
would have settled claims had it not been for the Royal Globe decision, it is neces-
sary to construct a synthetic that treats pre-Royal Globe claims with similar charac-
teristics in similar ways (i.e., create a synthetic state where insurers receive similar
claims and use a similar indemnification strategy to California). This is necessary
because insurers settle claims with different characteristics from different states in
different ways (Hawken et al., 2001; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002; Browne et al.,
2004; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009; Hyman et al., 2011; Tennyson and Asmat, 2010).
To do this, and to get a sense of potential heterogeneous treatment effects, I con-
duct the analysis by quantiles of the expected claimed loss.103
103Buchmueller et al. (2009), for example, divide observations into quantiles of the probability
of receiving health benefits in a voluntary market, to examine potential heterogeneous effects of
Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act. Additionally, Card (1993, 1995), divides observations into quar-
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Let Cist be the claimed loss for claimant i in state s in time of claim closure t,
andOist = (o1ist, ..., omist) be a vector ofm observable claims characteristics (i.e., the
claims characteristics in column 1 of Table 2). To group claims with similar char-
acteristics together, an OLS regression is used to calculate the expected claimed
loss for pre-Royal Globe claims (i.e., claims closed in 1977), L0 = E[Cist|Oi,s,t=1977].
The expected claimed loss for pre-Royal Globe claims, L0, is equally divided into Q
quantiles, q = 1, ..., Q, with A = (a1, . . . , a5) representing a vector of the maximum
L0 value in each quantile q (i.e., the values in column 4 of Table 3). Table 2 shows
the OLS results and Table 3 shows the range of values in each quantile q.
Once similar pre-Royal Globe claims are grouped together (into quantiles q),
weighted combinations of J potential control states are chosen to create synthetic
Californias that best resemble the expected value for each of K closed claim out-
comes (e.g., specials paid, fraud red-flags, etc.), labeled k = 1, . . . , K, inside of
each quantile q in California before Royal Globe and the expected value of each ofM
closed claim characteristics (e.g., sprain injury), labeledm = 1, ...,M , inside of Cali-
fornia before Royal Globe. LetW = (w1, . . . , wJ)′, a (J×1) vector where the scalarwj
represents the weight of state j in the synthetic California. Let the scalar yk,q repre-
sent the expected value of a closed claim outcome k in quantile q in California pre-
Royal Globe. That is yk,q = E[kistq|, s = California, t = 1977, q = z](z = 1, . . . , Q).
Let the scalar m represent the expected value of each claim characteristic mm in
California pre-Royal Globe. That is mm = E[mistq|s = California, t = 1977]. Then
let Yk = (yk,1, yk,2, . . . , yk,Q,m1, . . . ,mM)′ as a (QM × 1) vector and let Xk,j be a
(QM × J) matrix of the same values for the J potential control states.
Then, using the Abadie-Diamond-Hainmueller method and the “Synth” Stata
program developed by Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller,104 (see Abadie and
tiles of predicted education to compare the mean levels of education for men who grew up in areas
with or without a local college.
104The “Synth” program for Stata, MATLAB, and R is available on Jen Hainmueller’s webpage at
http://www.mit.edu/ jhainm/software.htm (accessed February 16, 2011).
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Table 2: OLS Estimation: ln(Claimed Loss)
Variable Coef. (Std. Err.)
Acc. Location: Central City 0.049 ( 0.056)
Acc. Location: Medium City -0.084 ( 0.061)
Acc. Location: Small Town -0.126 * ( 0.067)
Acc. Location: Rural -0.151 ** ( 0.076)
Claimant is Driver 0.100 ( 0.109)
Claimant is Passenger 0.013 ( 0.110)
Claimant is Other 0.357 ( 0.299)
Number of Other Vehicles in Accident 0.035 ( 0.032)
Male Claimant 0.317 *** ( 0.039)
Claimant’s Age 0.014 *** ( 0.001)
Extent of Disability: Temporary 0.951 *** ( 0.179)
Extent of Disability: Permanent Partial 0.950 *** ( 0.286)
Extent of Disability: Permanent Total 1.553 * ( 0.869)
Extent of Disability: Fatal 3.155 *** ( 0.218)
Injury: Sprain 0.413 *** ( 0.052)
Injury: Fracture 0.716 *** ( 0.073)
Injury: Laceration 0.028 ( 0.067)
Injury: Other 0.013 ( 0.045)
Inpatient Hospitalization: 1 Night 0.488 *** ( 0.163)
Inpatient Hospitalization: 2-7 Days 0.903 *** ( 0.079)
Inpatient Hospitalization: Over 7 Days 1.475 *** ( 0.085)
Wage Loss Claimed 1.275 *** ( 0.153)
Medical Loss Claimed 1.305 *** ( 0.150)
Other Expenses Claimed 0.609 *** ( 0.108)
Ext. of Dis: Temp. x Wage Loss Claimed -0.241 ( 0.176)
Ext. of Dis: Temp. x Medical Loss Claimed -0.319 * ( 0.166)
Ext. of Dis: Perm. Part. x Wage Loss Claimed 0.367 ( 0.278)
Ext. of Dis: Perm. Part. x Medical Loss Claimed 0.368 ( 0.250)
Ext. of Dis: Perm. Tot. x Wage Loss Claimed 0.012 ( 0.858)
Ext. of Dis: Perm. Tot. x Medical Loss Claimed 0.843 ( 0.740)
Ext. of Dis: Fatal x Wage Loss Claimed 0.790 ( 1.240)
Ext. of Dis: Fatal x Medical Loss Claimed -0.678 ( 0.540)
Constant 3.127 *** ( 0.202)
N 4,292
R2 0.367
Note: Omitted variables include: Acc. Location: Suburb; Claimant is Pedestrian; Extent of
Disability: and None; Inpatient Hospitalization: None. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1
percent confidence level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level; and * indicates
significance at the 10 percent confidence level.
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Table 3: Predicted Claimed Loss by Quantiles
(ln(claimed loss))
Quantile Mean Min. Max.
1 5.304 3.886 5.704
2 5.908 5.705 6.071
3 6.232 6.072 6.379
4 6.591 6.379 6.927
5 7.820 6.929 11.092
Note: The table shows the mean predicted claimed loss by quantile. The minimum and maximum
predicted claimed loss are also reported by quantile.
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion), I construct
a synthetic California for each closed claim outcome k. The synthetic is created by
choosing the weights,W∗, to minimize the distance
||Y −XW||V =
√
(Y −XW)′V(Y −XW), (1)
between Y and XW, where V, a (QM × QM) symmetric and positive semidef-
inite matrix, assigns weights to linear combinations of the variables in Y and X.
Following Abadie et al. (2010, 496), who build on Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
V is selected “among positive definite and diagonal matrices such that the mean
squared prediction error [(MSPE), which is the average of the squared discrep-
ancies between California and the synthetic California of the outcome variable,]
is minimized for the preintervention periods.” Further, to prevent extrapolation
(see Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, 117n; Abadie et al. 2010, 496), the procedure
to select weights W∗ is subject to the constraints: wj ≥ 0(j = 1, 2, . . . , J) and
w1 + . . .+ wJ = 1.105
The optimal weights, W∗, for each closed claim outcome are shown in Table
4. Figure 1 shows the closed claim outcomes for California and synthetic Califor-
105These constraints restrict the states included in the synthetic control to states that are similar
to California. If wj could be less than zero, thenW∗ could include weights that assign “penalty
terms” to states that are substantially different than California (Abadie et al., 2010, 496).
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nia for claims closed in 1977. For each closed claim outcome pre-Royal Globe, the
synthetic California closely approximates the real California. Table 5 shows that,
on average, for each of the closed claim outcomes for each quantile, the synthetic
California does a better job representing the real California than does the average
of the remaining potential control states. The MSPE, is lower - less than a sixth -
for the synthetic California than for the average of the potential control states.
Subsequently, to analyze the changes in California from Royal Globe, it is neces-
sary to produce California’s counterfactual for closed claims in 1987 (i.e., what the
closed claim outcomes would have been in California in 1987, but for Royal Globe).
To do this, the coefficients from the OLS model shown in Table 2 are applied to the
claims closed in 1987 to estimate the predicted claimed loss, had the 1987 closed
claims been closed in 1977, L1 = E[Ci,s,t=1987|Oi,s,t=1977]. Then, to match the 1987
closed claims to similar 1977 closed claims, L1 is divided into the same quantiles,
q = 1, ..., Q, as the 1977 closed claims, using the cutoff points A. Appendix Table
A.2 shows the mean values for claim characteristics by year closed and by quantile.
Using the same approach as the one used for the 1977 closed claims, I calculate the
mean for each closed claim outcome, k, in each potential control state, j, in each
quantile, q. Finally, the weights inW∗ are applied to the potential control states to
produce the synthetic California for closed claims in 1987 (i.e., California’s coun-
terfactual).
Then to further test the hypotheses, I run DD OLS regressions on the micro-
level data. “Because of the strengths of the synthetic control method,” I follow
Fitzpatrick (2008, 25)106 by applying the synthetic control method to the individual-
level data. To do this, I assign sample weights to each observation corresponding
to the weight for the observation’s state determined using the synthetic control
106Fitzpatrick (2008) followed the method for creating a synthetic control as defined by Abadie
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Figure 1: Closed claim outcomes: California vs. synthetic California, 1977





























































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Closed Claims Outcome Means
Closed claim outcome Quantile California Synthetic Cal. National Avg.
Days Until First Payment (1) 0.149 0.135 0.107
(2) 0.179 0.187 0.150
(3) 0.219 0.202 0.170
(4) 0.213 0.225 0.196
(5) 0.360 0.354 0.272
Fraud Red Flags (1) 0.346 0.321 0.292
(2) 0.438 0.402 0.369
(3) 0.489 0.476 0.433
(4) 0.431 0.434 0.359
(5) 0.291 0.264 0.219
Not Full Compensation (1) 0.017 0.017 0.017
(2) 0.027 0.026 0.041
(3) 0.023 0.021 0.013
(4) 0.024 0.026 0.020
(5) 0.099 0.096 0.040
Physical Examinations (1) 0.011 0.017 0.031
(2) 0.033 0.035 0.053
(3) 0.044 0.036 0.058
(4) 0.059 0.062 0.100
(5) 0.148 0.146 0.135
Specials Paid (1) 0.311 0.311 0.222
(2) 0.170 0.155 0.113
(3) 0.249 0.240 0.179
(4) 0.271 0.252 0.216
(5) 0.731 0.737 0.804
Total Paid (1) 0.225 0.219 0.139
(2) 0.382 0.321 0.306
(3) 0.504 0.487 0.399
(4) 0.623 0.609 0.522
(5) 1.811 1.822 2.069
MSPE - - 0.000 0.006
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method.107
Using the sample weights the following DD OLS model is run:
kist = α + β(Cals × Postt)st + λOist + States + τPostt + ist. (2)
The value kist represents the closed claim outcome of claim i in state s in time
closed t. Oist represents a vector of claim characteristics.108 State fixed effects are
represented by States. Postt is a binary variables that take on the value of one if the
claim is closed in 1987 and Cals is a binary variable that takes on the value of one
if the claim is from California. β is therefore the difference-in-differences estimate
of the effect of Royal Globe.
A simple placebo test shows that the DD OLS model 2, above, even while con-
trolling for individual claims characteristics and for state fixed effects, works better
when weighting each observation by the weight for that observation’s state as de-
termined by the synthetic control method than by not weighting at all.109 Using
the synthetic control method, described above, I create a synthetic state for each
potential control state, apply that synthetic control to the individual-level data by
assigning sample weights to each observation corresponding to the weight for the
observation’s state determined using the synthetic control method, and then run
model 2 to calculate the estimated treatment effect for each potential control state.
At the 5 percent confidence level, one would expect to find a statistically signifi-
107Fitzpatrick (2008) assesses the effects of Universal Pre-Kindergarten (“Pre-K”) in Georgia by
using individual-level student data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress. To
apply the synthetic control method to this individual-level data, Fitzpatrick (2008, 25) multiplies the
“the sample weights for each student’s observation by the corresponding weight for the student’s
state of residence from the synthetic control method.”
108Closed claim characteristics include dummy variables for the type of losses claimed (e.g., med-
ical losses), the location of the accident (e.g., central city), the claimant’s status (e.g., driver), the
claimant’s sex, the extent of disability (e.g., fatality), the type of injuries (e.g., sprain), and time
period in the hospital (e.g., 1 night). The log of the claimed loss, the number of vehicles in the
accident, and the age of the claimant are also included.
109See Bertrand et al. (2004), Cameron et al. (2008), and Buchmueller et al. (2009) for similar
placebo tests.
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cant result for approximately 5 percent of the placebo states. For all of the outcome
variables, Table 6 demonstrates that for the unweighted DD OLS regressions for
each potential control state, we can reject the null hypothesis of no effect at rates
significantly higher than 5 percent. Using the sampling weights, as calculated via
the synthetic control procedure, however, allows us to reject the null hypothesis at
the 5 percent confidence level, at rates much closer to 5 percent of the placebo states
than the unweighted models (will discuss why the rejection rate is still above 5 per-
cent and problems with clustering below). These results suggest that the weighted
models may be relying on a slightly weaker, more realistic assumption, that the
synthetic weights, when applied to the micro data, create better approximations
of the counterfactuals than all of the potential control states while just controlling
for individual claims characteristics. As we still find significant treatment effects,
even with weighting, for some outcomes for more than 5 percent of the potential
control states, the results, however, also suggest that the weighted DD OLS models
may still not be adequately controlling for all confounding effects.
One possible explanation is that the effects of Royal Globe may be heteroge-
neous. That is, Royal Globe may affect different subgroups of claims differently
(see e.g., Tennyson and Asmat, 2010). In order to test for this possibility, I conduct
Chow Tests (Chow, 1960), which test for equality between sets of coefficients in
two regressions. If Royal Globe affects different subgroups of claims in different
ways, then a Chow Test will confirm that the coefficients in regressions run on two
different subgroups will be statistically different. The Chow Test has been applied
to test for structural differences on the impacts on subgroups in a wide range of
situations110 and due to the large sample size of this data, is well suited for this
110See e.g., Crain and Zardkoohi (1978, 401-403) (to test for structural differences in operating
costs between public and private firms); Chrisman (1989, 410) (to determine if the data for clients
who seek operating and administrative assistance can be pooled when examining the value added
by outside consultants to pre-venture entrepreneurs); Lemmink et al. (1998, 171) (“to test whether
. . . different purposes [for visiting restaurants] would affect dynamics of satisfaction formation”);
Schlenker et al. (2005, 399)(“. . . to determine whether all coefficients for the two groups of dryland,
45
Table 6: Placebo Test
(Rejection rates for weighted vs. unweighted DD OLS regressions at 5 percent confidence level)
Variable Unweighted Weighted Difference
Total paid (in 10, 000) 0.600 *** 0.100 0.500 ***
( 0.112) ( 0.069) ( 0.136)
Specials paid (in 10, 000) 0.250 * 0.200 0.050
( 0.099) ( 0.092) ( 0.088)
Fraud red flags 0.650 *** 0.500 *** 0.150 *
( 0.109) ( 0.115) ( 0.082)
Days until first payment 0.800 *** 0.300 ** 0.500 ***
( 0.092) ( 0.105) ( 0.136)
Physical exam 0.550 *** 0.100 0.450 ***
( 0.114) ( 0.069) ( 0.135)
Under-compensation 0.550 *** 0.500 *** 0.050
( 0.114) ( 0.115) ( 0.153)
Note: Reject rates represent the percent of placebo states that rejected the null hypothesis of no
effect at the five percent confidence level for β in model 2. The standard errors were clustered at
the state level. To correct for a small number of clusters (states), the critical values used for the five
percent confidence level were based on a t-distribution with (number of clusters) - (constants per
cluster) degrees of freedom rather than on the standard normal distribution (see Angrist and
Pischke, 2009, 319-323). Standard errors of the rejection rates are in parentheses. *** indicates
significance at the 1% confidence level that the rejection rate is different from 0.05 for weighted
and unweighed columns, or that the rejection rates are different from each other for the difference
column; ** indicates significance at the 5% confidence level that the rejection rate is different from
0.05 for weighted and unweighed columns, or that the rejection rates are different from each other
for the difference column; * indicates significance at the 10% confidence level that the rejection rate
is different from 0.05 for weighted and unweighed columns, or that the rejection rates are different
from each other for the difference column.
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application.111 The Chow Tests are used to test for differing subgroup effects be-
tween claims with and without fraud red flags, and between claims in the bottom
half of claimed losses and top half of claimed losses.
non-urban and irrigated, non-urban counties are jointly the same”); Choudhury and Radhakrish-
nan (2009, 17) (testing for the “differential effect on Statistics course performance due to different
mathematical background”); and Ma (2011, 17) (to test if “the growth model is different across rich
and poor countries”).
111Toyodo (1974) shows that the Chow-Test (Chow, 1960), which assumes homoscedasticity, is
still valid under heteroscedasticity if the sample size of one of the subgroups being tested is large,
which is the case here.
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5 Results
5.1 Aggregate Results by Quintile of Expected Claimed Loss
Figure 2 shows the closed claim outcomes for California and synthetic California
for claims closed in 1977 and 1987 by quantiles of expected claimed loss. Figure 3
then shows the gaps between California and synthetic California, with the gaps in
the 1987 panel representing the estimated treatment effects of Royal Globe. Based
on Figure 3, there appear to be significant results, especially for smaller claims,
across every closed claim outcome. The specials paid, total paid, average days
until compensation, and fraud red flags all appear to increase, with the largest
increases resulting for smaller claims. At the same time, the probability of under-
compensation decreases for the smallest claims, while the probability of a physical
examination increases for the largest claims.
To provide a test of the significance of these results, placebo (or “falsification”)
tests are conducted. The placebo test used here is based on the tests used by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010).112 After using a synthetic control
method to study the economic effects of terrorism on the Basque Country, Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) check the ability of the synthetic to produce a valid coun-
terfactual by running a placebo test by conducting the same analysis for Catalonia,
a region with significantly less terrorist activity than the Basque Country. Further,
to test the significance of their findings on the effects of Proposition 99 on per-
112Other similar placebo tests were conducted by DiNardo and Pischke (1997) and Bertrand et al.
(2004). After Krueger (1993) found that workers who use computers on the job earn 15 to 20 per-
cent more than other workers, many people concluded that employers pay more for people with
computer skills. DiNardo and Pischke (1997) test this hypothesis by comparing the estimated wage
differential for those who use pencils, staplers, and calculators to the estimated wage differential
for those who use computers. The authors show a similar wage differential, which casts doubt
on the idea that the wage differential for computer users is caused by increased returns for that
specific skill. In addition, to test the reliability of differences-in-differences inference techniques,
Bertrand et al. (2004) conduct a similar type of falsification on a long time series by randomly set-
ting the dates of placebo interventions. See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009, 67-72) for a review of
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Figure 2: Closed claim outcomes: California vs. synthetic California
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Figure 3: Closed claim outcomes: Gap between California and synthetic California
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capita cigarette sale in California, Abadie et al. (2010) apply the synthetic control
method to each of 38 potential control states. The authors then compare the gaps
in per-capita cigarette sales between each control and its synthetic to the same gap
between California and synthetic California.
The goal of the placebo tests is to answer the question posed by Abadie et al.
(2010, 501): “How often would we obtain results of this magnitude if we had cho-
sen a state at random for the study instead of [the treated state, California]?” Here,
the placebo tests are run by applying the synthetic control method to each poten-
tial control state and then comparing the gaps between California and the potential
control states. If the post-Royal Globe gap for California is “unusually large” rela-
tive to the post-Royal Globe gap for the control states, then this suggests that there
is significant evidence of an effect from California adopting the Royal Globe deci-
sion (Abadie et al. 2010, 501; also see Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Bertrand et al.
2004; Buchmueller et al. 2009).
Figure 4 shows the gaps for California (the solid line) and the gaps for all of the
potential control states (the grey lines). Following Abadie et al. (2010), I remove
any states that do not have an adequate counterfactual (i.e., states with a pre-Royal
Globe MSPE of more than ten times that of California).113 Table 7 shows the post-
Royal Globe gaps in California by closed claim outcome and by quantile. To make
inferences based on these results, I use the distribution of the placebo states to
“construct regions of acceptance and rejection for the null hypothesis” that the
Royal Globe effect is zero (Buchmueller et al., 2009, 19). Any gap estimate that falls
below the 2.5th percentile of placebo gaps or above the 97.5th percentile of placebo
gaps is deemed significant at the five percent level.
The results show that there are systematic differences in how insurers treat dif-
ferent subgroups of claims, which is consistent with previous models (Bond and
113Abadie et al. (2010, 501-503) remove states with a pre period MSPE of 20 times, 5 times, and
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Figure 4: Closed claim outcomes: Gap between California and synthetic California and
gaps for all placebo states (discards states with pre-Royal Globe MSPE ten times higher than
California’s)
Note: California gap is black line. Placebo gaps are grey lines.
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Table 7: Estimated Closed Claim Outcome Gaps, 1987
(placebo tests, California vs. control states with pre-Royal Globe MSPE less than ten times higher
than California’s)
Quantile of Expected Claimed Loss
1 2 3 4 5
Total paid (in 10, 000)
0.192 ** 0.265 ** 0.293 ** 0.238 ** 0.064
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.045 -0.086 -0.127 -0.118 -0.337
97.5th percentile 0.053 0.097 0.269 0.115 0.374
Specials paid (in 10, 000)
0.099 ** 0.114 ** 0.148 0.045 -0.104
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.014 -0.034 -0.026 -0.060 -0.497
97.5th percentile 0.042 0.027 0.221 0.425 0.097
Probability of undercompensation
-0.036 -0.059 -0.064 -0.019 -0.003
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.081 -0.068 -0.208 -0.053 -0.137
97.5th percentile 0.083 0.200 0.282 0.117 0.208
Average days until first payment (in 1,000)
0.073 ** 0.084 ** 0.017 0.035 0.044
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.036 -0.137 -0.088 -0.054 -0.115
97.5th percentile 0.038 0.038 0.070 0.044 0.111
Fraud red-flags
0.083 ** 0.080 0.042 0.042 0.013
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.124 -0.214 -0.147 -0.168 -0.095
97.5th percentile 0.079 0.235 0.143 0.109 0.141
Probability of physical exam
0.005 -0.012 0.032 ** 0.011 0.012
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.017 -0.055 -0.009 -0.015 -0.050
97.5th percentile 0.010 0.050 0.023 0.063 0.086
Note: Estimated using synthetic control method aggregated by state and by quantile of predicted
claimed loss as explained in the text. ** indicates significance at the 5% confidence level (i.e., Gap
for California above or below the 97.5th or 2.5th percentile of gaps for placebo states).
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Crocker, 1997; Crocker and Morgan, 1998; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002). Figure 2
shows that even before Royal Globe, insurers were treating different subgroups of
claims in different ways. For example, pre-Royal Globe, the rate of undercompen-
sation was relatively constant across the first four quantiles of expected claimed
loss but spiked for the fifth quantile. Also, the results shown in Figures 3 and 4
show that after Royal Globe, insurers changed their settlement practices for differ-
ent quantiles of expected claimed losses in different (not linear) ways. For example,
the average number of days until payment significantly increased for claims with
a smaller expected claimed loss but did not significantly change for claims with
larger expected claimed losses.
In addition, the results shown in Figure 4, with the associated numerical esti-
mates shown in Table 7, suggest that the rate of insurance company investigations
does not decrease (and may even increase for some claims) after Royal Globe and
that insurers may not be rushing to settle claims as there is a slight increase in
the average days until payment for smaller claims. Equally surprising, the rate
of fraud red flags in closed claims does not appear to significantly increase either,
with a possible exception being for really small claims (i.e., the first quantile of
expected claimed loss). These results are contrary to the negative predictions of
the effects of increased bad faith liability made by Abraham (1986); Sykes (1996);
Tennyson and Warfel (2009).
Further, the results in Figure 4 and Table 7, support the early findings by Hawken
et al. (2001); Browne et al. (2004); Tennyson and Asmat (2010) that increased bad
faith liability results in an increase in the total amount paid for closed claims. From
the first to fourth quantile of expected claimed loss, claims settlements in California
increased, on average, by about $1,920 - $2,930. In comparison, the 97.5th percentile
of placebo gaps in the first quantile was only $530. Additionally, the Royal Globe
decision appears to have only resulted in larger payments for smaller claims. The
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claims in the fifth quantile of expected claimed loss do not see a significant increase
in total payments. This is consistent with Tennyson and Asmat (2010) who find a
larger effect of bad faith liability on smaller claims.
5.2 Micro-Level Results
To further test the hypotheses, I apply the synthetic control method to the micro-
level data by applying a sample weight to each observation corresponding to the
weight determined for that observation’s state by the synthetic control method.
Using those sample weights, I conduct DD OLS regressions of the form shown in
model 2. I first run the regressions on the full sample. I then run the Chow Tests
(Chow, 1960) shown in Table 8, which suggest that there are systematic differences
in the indemnification strategies insurers use for different subgroups of claims. For
every outcome variable the Chow Tests reveal a significant difference at the 1 per-
cent confidence level between the models for fraud and non-fraud red flag claims
subgroups. The Chow Tests also reveal significant differences at the 1 percent con-
fidence level for small and large claim subgroups for the days until payment and
fraud red flags outcome variables. These results support the above findings from
the aggregate results and the previous literature that insurers treat different sub-
groups of claims in systematically different ways (see Bond and Crocker, 1997;
Crocker and Morgan, 1998; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002). The OLS regressions are
therefore run on small, large, fraud red flags, and no fraud red flags subgroups.
Depending on the subgroups that insurers use to distinguish classes of claims,
however, the OLS results may not be as valid as the aggregate results. For reasons
discussed below, the aggregate models may do a better job accommodating the
different indemnification schedules that insurers have for different subgroups of
claims than the OLS models do.
Table 9 shows the results of these regressions. The results support the view
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Table 8: Chow Tests for Differing Subgroup Effects
(Small vs. large claims AND Fraud vs. no fraud red flag claims)
Claims Subgroups
Small vs. large Fraud vs. no fraud
Specials paid F(34, 5681) = 0.090 F(34, 5681) = 8.963
Total paid F(34, 7508) = 0.327 F(34, 7508) = 6.076
Probability of undercompensation F(35, 7202) = 0.807 F(35, 7202) = 12.519
Probability of physical exam F(38, 8986) = 0.708 F(38, 8986) = 23.448
Average days until first payment F(33, 5444) = 1.898 F(33, 5444) = 5.779
Fraud red-flags F(34, 7848) = 177.238 -
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects and controls for individual claim characteristics.
Observations are weighed by the weight for their state determined by the synthetic control
method. The fraud subgroup contains claims with more than zero fraud red flags. The small
subgroup contains claims in the bottom 50th percentile of claimed losses.
that insurers utilize systematically different indemnification schedules for differ-
ent subgroups of claims. Also, the results are largely consistent with prior theory
and OLS results. For example, the specials paid are estimated to increase (Browne
et al., 2004; Tennyson and Asmat, 2010), the probability of undercompensation is
estimated to decrease (Tennyson and Asmat, 2010), the probability of a physical
exam is estimated to decrease (Tennyson and Warfel, 2009), and the number of
fraud red flags is estimated to increase (Tennyson and Warfel, 2009). The infer-
ences from the OLS estimates may be more challenging, however, than relying on
the usual standard errors.
As with most DD studies where the treatment is at the state level, there exists
a problem caused by intraclass correlation (see e.g., White, 1980; Moulton, 1986;
Liang and Zeger, 1986; Bell and McCaffrey, 2002; Donald and Lang, 2007; Bertrand
et al., 2004; Hansen, 2007a,b; Cameron et al., 2008; Angrist and Lavy, 2002; Angrist
and Pischke, 2009; Buchmueller et al., 2009).114 While this problem can be corrected
by clustering standard errors at the state level (which is done here), the asymptotic
justification assumes that the number of clusters approaches infinity (Wooldridge,
114Bertrand et al. (2004) show that only 36 out of 80 surveyed DD papers with grouped error terms
actually address the problem by clustering standard errors or aggregating the data.
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Table 9: Difference-in-Difference OLS Estimates
All Subgroups
Large Small No Fraud Fraud
Specials paid 0.085 *** 0.011 -0.076 *** 0.185 *** 0.001
( 0.029) ( 0.033) ( 0.020) ( 0.051) ( 0.082)
R2 0.895 0.801 0.747 0.879 0.904
N 5,749 3,489 2,260 1,509 4,240
Total paid 0.042 -0.059 *** -0.010 -0.037 0.101
( 0.065) ( 0.022) ( 0.124) ( 0.056) ( 0.118)
R2 0.755 0.581 0.460 0.754 0.759
N 7,576 4,323 3,253 2,030 5,546
Probability of undercompensation -0.028 *** -0.036 *** -0.015 *** -0.036 *** -0.026 ***
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.005) ( 0.007) ( 0.003)
R2 0.045 0.062 0.034 0.076 0.043
N 7,272 4,161 3,111 2,004 5,268
Probability of physical exam -0.010 ** -0.007 -0.001 -0.036 *** 0.005 *
( 0.004) ( 0.005) ( 0.004) ( 0.007) ( 0.003)
R2 0.065 0.077 0.021 0.101 0.061
N 9,062 4,941 4,121 2,528 6,534
Average days until first payment 26.602 *** 25.320 * 27.620 *** -12.265 * 42.155 ***
( 6.221) ( 13.020) ( 2.808) ( 6.722) ( 6.995)
R2 0.176 0.089 0.095 0.173 0.193
N 5,510 3,405 2,105 1,410 4,100
Fraud red-flags 0.030 *** 0.022 * 0.034 *** - -
( 0.007) ( 0.013) ( 0.011)
R2 0.496 0.488 0.516 - -
N 7,916 4,600 3,316 - -
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects and controls for individual claim characteristics.
Observations are weighed by the weight for their state determined by the synthetic control
method. Standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors clustered at
the state level. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent confidence level; ** indicates
significance at the 5 percent confidence level; and * indicates significance at the 10 percent
confidence level.
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2003; Cameron et al., 2008; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Buchmueller et al., 2009).
When this is not the case, the standard errors are downward biased and there is
a tendency to over reject the null hypothesis.115 Clearly, the assumption that the
number of clusters trends to infinity is not the case in this situation. Note that the
rejection rates in the placebo test in Table 6, above, are significantly higher than 5
percent.
Therefore, to make inferences on the significance of the DD OLS results, I con-
tinue to implement placebo tests like the ones instituted above. Consistent with
Buchmueller et al. (2009), who faced a similar clustering problem, I construct ac-
ceptance and rejection regions based on the distributions of placebo estimates from
the OLS regressions. If the effect on California is significantly greater than the es-
timated effects for the placebo states (outside of the 2.5th - 97.5th percentile range
of placebo estimates), then the impact is deemed significant. This method also
resembles the placebo tests conducted by Bertrand et al. (2004) and Abadie et al.
(2010) and does not rely on asymptotic assumptions. As Abadie et al. (2010, 497)
argue, this type of “inferential exercise is exact in the sense that, regardless of the
number of available comparison regions, time periods, and whether the data are
individual or aggregate, it is always possible to calculate the exact distribution
of the estimated effect of the placebo interventions” (see also, Buchmueller et al.,
2009, 18). This approach produces more “conservative inferences” (Buchmueller
et al., 2009, 19).
Table 10 shows the DD OLS estimates from Table 9 and compares the magni-
tude of the estimated coefficient from California to the distribution of the mag-
nitudes from the same models for each potential control state. Doing so reduces
the amount of statistically significant estimates to zero. The estimates for some
115See Angrist and Pischke (2009, 319-323) for a discussion of potential corrections to the cluster-
ing problem.
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states, however, may rest on a relatively small number of claims.116 While this, in
and of itself, may be a finding, the more likely explanation is that the subgroups
used (i.e., small vs. large claims, and fraud vs. no fraud red flags claims) do not
accurately represent the subgroups that insurers use when creating their different
indemnification schedules. If insurers do use systematically different indemnifica-
tion schedules (which the above results and prior literature suggests they do), then
the OLS results will not provide valid estimates, unless the correct subgroups are
identified and estimated separately (or with fully interacted models).
I argue that in this situation the most valid estimates are from the aggregate
results. Both Bond and Crocker (1997) and Crocker and Morgan (1998) develop
models of insurance indemnification that treat claims in systematically different
ways based on the claimed loss. The aggregate analysis groups similar claims into
quantiles of expected claimed loss and allows for completely different effects in
each quantile. If the quantile groupings are roughly similar to the subgroups that
insurers use, which they may be if insurers follow Bond and Crocker (1997) and
Crocker and Morgan (1998), then the estimated results will approximate the accu-
rate treatment effects. Further, Figure 5 confirms that fraud red flags tend to cluster
in different quantiles. Therefore, if insurers use fraud red flags, alternatively or in
conjunction with claimed amount, to divide claims into subgroups, then the aggre-
gate results by quantile may still be the more accurate measure of treatment effects.
Replicating those cutoffs with the DD OLS models would involve conducting sep-
arate analyses for each of the created subgroups and would thus lack subsample
variation in the variables shown in Table 2. For these reasons, the aggregate results
may be the more accurate estimates.
116The results are robust to only using statistically significant estimates (based on normal standard
errors) when constructing the distributions of placebo estimates.
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Table 10: Difference-in-Differences OLS Estimates with Placebo Tests
(California vs. control states with 1977 MSPE less than ten times higher than California’s)
All Subgroups
Large Small Fraud No Fraud
Specials paid
0.085 0.011 -0.076 0.185 0.001
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.159 -0.298 -0.618 -0.301 -0.264
97.5th percentile 0.128 0.226 0.661 0.195 0.480
Total paid
0.042 -0.059 -0.010 -0.037 0.101
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.293 -0.195 -0.912 -0.756 -0.493
97.5th percentile 0.389 0.247 0.604 0.361 0.789
Probability of undercompensation
-0.028 -0.036 -0.015 -0.036 -0.026
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.051 -0.295 -0.049 -0.112 -0.076
97.5th percentile 0.179 0.253 0.071 0.244 0.124
Probability of physical exam
-0.010 -0.007 -0.001 -0.036 0.005
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.108 -0.182 -0.184 -0.192 -0.315
97.5th percentile 0.026 0.038 0.060 0.091 0.028
Average days until first payment
26.602 25.320 27.620 -12.265 42.155
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -36.523 -82.732 -92.897 -112.053 -90.996
97.5th percentile 138.802 97.116 158.120 142.627 129.401
Fraud red-flags
0.030 0.022 0.034 - -
Placebo tests (other states)
2.5th percentile -0.085 -0.072 -0.104 - -
97.5th percentile 0.100 0.138 0.141 - -
Note: All regressions include state fixed effects and controls for individual claim characteristics.
Observations are weighed by the weight for their state determined by the synthetic control
method. ** indicates significance at the 5% confidence level (i.e., Gap for California above or
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Figure 5: Distribution of fraud red flags across quantiles of expected claimed loss
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6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of adopting the Royal Globe doctrine (increas-
ing insurance bad faith liability) on automobile bodily injury insurance claims out-
comes. The study provides new evidence over a wide range of claim outcomes to
paint a fuller picture of the effects of increased bad faith liability. The use of a
“natural experiment” created by the “random” nature of the Royal Globe decision
and the utilization of the powerful synthetic control method allows the study to
make causal estimates on observed claims settlement practices, an advantage over
previous work.
The empirical results support two important findings. First, consistent with
previous theories of claims settlement practices (Bond and Crocker, 1997; Crocker
and Morgan, 1998; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002), insurers appear to treat different
subgroups of claims in systematically different ways. The aggregate analysis by
quantiles of expected claimed loss and the micro-level Chow-Tests for differing
subgroup effects for fraud vs. non-fraud red flag claims and small vs. large claims
both support this conclusion.
Second, the empirical results are largely consistent with an efficient applica-
tion of bad faith liability (i.e., the application of potential punitive damages). The
aggregate analysis by quantiles of expected claimed loss and the micro-level OLS
models suggest that the predicted negative effects of increased bad faith liability
on insurers’ claim settlement practices do not appear to be severe (or significantly
exist) (see Abraham, 1986; Sykes, 1996; Tennyson and Warfel, 2009). I generally
find no significant increase in the prevalence of fraud red flags and no significant
decrease (and possibly an increase) in the rate of insurance company investiga-
tions for closed claims. Similarly, there is no evidence that insurers are rushing to
settle claims as there is no decrease in the average days until payment and even a
slight increase for the smallest claims. Also, the aggregate analysis finds that the
62
total amount paid significantly increases for claims in the lowest four quintiles of
expected claimed loss. These claims are still small as the 99th percentile of claimed
losses in the fourth quintile is only $6,207. This is consistent with the efficient use of
punitive damages to protect small claims that are systematically underpaid, where
the “aggregate damages may be significant, [but] no single victim of the wrongful
act [without potential punitive damages] has sufficient damages to make suing
worthwhile” (Posner, 2006, 746).
In the future, as people continue to debate the issue of consumer protection in
the insurance industry, these results suggest that a more market based approach
may be appropriate.117 Individual consumers are the first person (and likely only
person) to know if they are underpaid and can thus privately bring any necessary
suits against insurers.118 Standard breach of contact suits should work fine for
larger claims and the additional expected damages from potential punitive dam-
ages should give small claims that are underpaid enough of an incentive to file
suit. As long as the punitive damages are correctly applied to the “rare” subgroup
of claims where additional damages are necessary to deter opportunistic behav-
ior by the insurer (Posner, 2006, 746), a reliance on the private market and private
enforcement should be efficient. These results suggest that insurers are not too de-
terred that they start paying more fraudulent claims and doing less investigations,
and that the true beneficiaries of bad faith liability may be those small claims that
absent the additional punitive damages would have no incentive to sue.
Despite these interesting findings, and even with the advantages of detailed
micro-level data and a “quasi-experimental” treatment, more research is still needed.
117For a discussion of the benefits of ex post liability versus ex ante regulations see Calabresi
(1970); Weitzman (1974); Wittman (1977); Shavell (1984); Rose-Ackerman (1991); So¨llner (1994,
1996); Schwarze (1996).
118Private enforcement is optimal in situations where private parties know the identities of their
injurers, their harm, and are the lowest cost enforcers (Shavell, 1984, 1993). In the insurance context,
private parties posses all of the necessary information and have the incentive to pursue enforce-
ment at any point where the marginal benefit of enforcement for them is greater than the marginal
cost of enforcement to them (see Becker and Stigler, 1974).
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While I show findings consistent with efficiency, the lack of data on denied claims
and settlement negotiations precludes ruling out alternative scenarios. For exam-
ple, even though the rate of insurers’ investigations for closed claims does not
decrease, it is possible that insurers just deny more claims and maintain their in-
vestigation rate among the smaller subgroup of claims that they pay some amount
to. Therefore, to assess the full net social costs and benefits of increased insurance
bad faith liability, more research, especially on claimant practices and the effects
on all claims, would be useful.
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Ln(Claimed loss) 1 5.256 5.763 -0.507 ***
( 0.041) ( 0.023) ( 0.051)
2 5.856 6.396 -0.540 ***
( 0.043) ( 0.036) ( 0.057)
3 6.263 6.658 -0.396 ***
( 0.043) ( 0.045) ( 0.062)
4 6.597 6.818 -0.221 ***
( 0.042) ( 0.031) ( 0.051)
5 7.883 7.789 0.094 *
( 0.044) ( 0.025) ( 0.053)
Acc. Location: Central City 1 0.304 0.323 -0.020
( 0.016) ( 0.008) ( 0.018)
2 0.316 0.430 -0.114 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.021)
3 0.410 0.402 0.007
( 0.017) ( 0.017) ( 0.024)
4 0.443 0.314 0.129 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.013) ( 0.021)
5 0.332 0.399 -0.067 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.009) ( 0.019)
Acc. Location: Medium City 1 0.248 0.297 -0.049 ***
( 0.015) ( 0.008) ( 0.017)
2 0.247 0.233 0.014
( 0.015) ( 0.011) ( 0.019)
3 0.203 0.239 -0.036 *
( 0.014) ( 0.015) ( 0.020)
4 0.189 0.313 -0.125 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.019)
5 0.206 0.236 -0.030 *
( 0.014) ( 0.008) ( 0.016)
Acc. Location: Small Town 1 0.182 0.106 0.075 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.005) ( 0.012)
2 0.171 0.070 0.101 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.007) ( 0.013)
3 0.128 0.090 0.038 **
( 0.011) ( 0.010) ( 0.015)
4 0.129 0.094 0.034 **
( 0.012) ( 0.008) ( 0.014)
5 0.161 0.080 0.081 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.005) ( 0.011)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Acc. Location: Rural 1 0.118 0.067 0.051 ***
( 0.011) ( 0.004) ( 0.010)
2 0.079 0.050 0.029 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.006) ( 0.010)
3 0.083 0.068 0.015
( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.013)
4 0.077 0.077 0.000
( 0.009) ( 0.007) ( 0.012)
5 0.166 0.077 0.088 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.005) ( 0.011)
Claimant is Driver 1 0.598 0.467 0.132 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.008) ( 0.019)
2 0.664 0.654 0.010
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.021)
3 0.795 0.640 0.156 ***
( 0.014) ( 0.017) ( 0.022)
4 0.811 0.618 0.194 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.020)
5 0.640 0.744 -0.104 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.008) ( 0.017)
Claimant is Passenger 1 0.356 0.482 -0.125 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.008) ( 0.019)
2 0.311 0.306 0.005
( 0.016) ( 0.012) ( 0.020)
3 0.180 0.301 -0.122 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.016) ( 0.021)
4 0.162 0.324 -0.163 ***
( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.019)
5 0.276 0.195 0.081 ***
( 0.015) ( 0.007) ( 0.016)
Claimant is Other 1 0.005 0.006 -0.001
( 0.002) ( 0.001) ( 0.003)
2 0.001 0.015 -0.014 ***
( 0.001) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
3 0.003 0.010 -0.006
( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
4 0.005 0.010 -0.005
( 0.002) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
5 0.008 0.013 -0.005
( 0.003) ( 0.002) ( 0.004)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Number of Other Vehicles in Accident 1 1.111 1.080 0.031
( 0.019) ( 0.009) ( 0.021)
2 1.199 1.286 -0.087
( 0.021) ( 0.042) ( 0.056)
3 1.213 1.213 0.000
( 0.019) ( 0.056) ( 0.057)
4 1.246 1.175 0.071
( 0.023) ( 0.036) ( 0.049)
5 1.101 1.205 -0.104 *
( 0.023) ( 0.028) ( 0.053)
Male Claimant 1 0.346 0.362 -0.016
( 0.016) ( 0.008) ( 0.018)
2 0.341 0.500 -0.159 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.021)
3 0.567 0.585 -0.018
( 0.017) ( 0.017) ( 0.024)
4 0.680 0.401 0.280 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.021)
5 0.647 0.557 0.090 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.009) ( 0.019)
Claimant’s Age 1 26.687 23.817 2.870 ***
( 0.420) ( 0.223) ( 0.498)
2 28.256 36.514 -8.258 ***
( 0.404) ( 0.437) ( 0.639)
3 31.083 38.237 -7.155 ***
( 0.393) ( 0.631) ( 0.733)
4 38.071 34.287 3.784 ***
( 0.503) ( 0.450) ( 0.695)
5 36.833 36.000 0.834
( 0.580) ( 0.264) ( 0.585)
Extent of Disability: Temporary 1 0.229 0.042 0.187 ***
( 0.014) ( 0.003) ( 0.010)
2 0.852 0.362 0.490 ***
( 0.012) ( 0.013) ( 0.019)
3 0.955 0.615 0.340 ***
( 0.007) ( 0.017) ( 0.018)
4 0.882 0.600 0.282 ***
( 0.011) ( 0.013) ( 0.019)
5 0.559 0.753 -0.193 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.008) ( 0.017)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Extent of Disability: Permanent Partial 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
2 0.007 0.002 0.005 *
( 0.003) ( 0.001) ( 0.003)
3 0.012 0.005 0.007
( 0.004) ( 0.002) ( 0.004)
4 0.067 0.031 0.036 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.005) ( 0.009)
5 0.304 0.125 0.179 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.006) ( 0.014)
Extent of Disability: Permanent Total 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
2 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
3 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
4 0.001 0.000 0.001
( 0.001) ( 0.000) ( 0.001)
5 0.015 0.007 0.009 **
( 0.004) ( 0.001) ( 0.004)
Extent of Disability: Fatal 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
2 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
3 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
4 0.000 0.001 -0.001
( 0.000) ( 0.001) ( 0.001)
5 0.097 0.016 0.081 ***
( 0.010) ( 0.002) ( 0.007)
Injury: Sprain 1 0.482 0.650 -0.168 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.008) ( 0.018)
2 0.702 0.883 -0.181 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.009) ( 0.016)
3 0.893 0.819 0.074 ***
( 0.010) ( 0.014) ( 0.017)
4 0.787 0.784 0.002
( 0.014) ( 0.011) ( 0.018)
5 0.599 0.829 -0.230 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.007) ( 0.016)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Injury: Fracture 1 0.008 0.004 0.004
( 0.003) ( 0.001) ( 0.003)
2 0.010 0.017 -0.006
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.005)
3 0.033 0.043 -0.010
( 0.006) ( 0.007) ( 0.009)
4 0.114 0.063 0.051 ***
( 0.011) ( 0.007) ( 0.012)
5 0.380 0.144 0.236 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.006) ( 0.015)
Injury: Laceration 1 0.113 0.306 -0.193 ***
( 0.011) ( 0.008) ( 0.017)
2 0.092 0.169 -0.077 ***
( 0.010) ( 0.010) ( 0.015)
3 0.059 0.220 -0.161 ***
( 0.008) ( 0.015) ( 0.016)
4 0.086 0.235 -0.149 ***
( 0.010) ( 0.012) ( 0.016)
5 0.145 0.211 -0.066 ***
( 0.012) ( 0.007) ( 0.015)
Injury: Other 1 0.496 0.143 0.353 ***
( 0.017) ( 0.006) ( 0.015)
2 0.352 0.136 0.216 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.009) ( 0.017)
3 0.220 0.171 0.049 **
( 0.014) ( 0.013) ( 0.019)
4 0.271 0.183 0.088 ***
( 0.015) ( 0.011) ( 0.018)
5 0.339 0.237 0.102 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.008) ( 0.017)
Inpatient Hospitalization: 1 Night 1 0.006 0.001 0.005 ***
( 0.003) ( 0.000) ( 0.002)
2 0.005 0.004 0.000
( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.003)
3 0.006 0.012 -0.007
( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.005)
4 0.022 0.018 0.004
( 0.005) ( 0.004) ( 0.006)
5 0.030 0.027 0.004
( 0.006) ( 0.003) ( 0.006)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Inpatient Hospitalization: 2-7 Days 1 0.001 0.002 -0.001
( 0.001) ( 0.001) ( 0.002)
2 0.006 0.009 -0.003
( 0.003) ( 0.002) ( 0.004)
3 0.010 0.016 -0.006
( 0.003) ( 0.004) ( 0.006)
4 0.075 0.035 0.041 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.005) ( 0.010)
5 0.246 0.089 0.157 ***
( 0.015) ( 0.005) ( 0.012)
Inpatient Hospitalization: Over 7 Days 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
2 0.001 0.000 0.001
( 0.001) ( 0.000) ( 0.001)
3 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
4 0.006 0.001 0.005 **
( 0.003) ( 0.001) ( 0.002)
5 0.333 0.070 0.264 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.005) ( 0.012)
Wage Loss Claimed 1 0.654 0.013 0.641 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.002) ( 0.009)
2 0.854 0.028 0.826 ***
( 0.012) ( 0.004) ( 0.011)
3 0.918 0.122 0.797 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.011) ( 0.015)
4 0.932 0.573 0.359 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.013) ( 0.018)
5 0.796 0.879 -0.083 ***
( 0.014) ( 0.006) ( 0.013)
Medical Loss Claimed 1 0.293 0.978 -0.685 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.002) ( 0.009)
2 0.133 0.979 -0.846 ***
( 0.012) ( 0.004) ( 0.010)
3 0.084 0.968 -0.884 ***
( 0.009) ( 0.006) ( 0.011)
4 0.154 0.986 -0.832 ***
( 0.012) ( 0.003) ( 0.011)
5 0.353 0.992 -0.639 ***
( 0.016) ( 0.002) ( 0.009)
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Table A.2: Claims Characteristics by Quantile by Year, cont.
Variable q 1977 1987 Difference
Other Expenses Claimed 1 0.052 0.017 0.035 ***
( 0.008) ( 0.002) ( 0.006)
2 0.019 0.051 -0.033 ***
( 0.005) ( 0.006) ( 0.008)
3 0.013 0.103 -0.091 ***
( 0.004) ( 0.011) ( 0.011)
4 0.035 0.085 -0.050 ***
( 0.006) ( 0.008) ( 0.011)
5 0.166 0.132 0.034 **
( 0.013) ( 0.006) ( 0.013)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Differences: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1
percent confidence level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent confidence level; and * indicates
significance at the 10 percent confidence level.
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